Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law by Holden, Michael R.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 80
Issue 6 September 1995 Article 5
Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An
Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law
Michael R. Holden
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Holden, Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law ,
80 Cornell L. Rev. 1695 (1995)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol80/iss6/5
ARBITRATION OF STATE-LAW CLAIMS BY EMPLOYEES:
AN ARGUMENT FOR CONTAINING FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW
INTRODUCTION
When Robin Harris's new boss demoted her, replaced her with a
white man, and cut her salary, she attributed his actions to racial dis-
crimination.' After she sued in a state court, she was surprised to
learn that she had signed a form requiring her to arbitrate instead.2
Like many employees, she had waived the right to assert claims against
her employer in ajudicial forum. She was outraged: "You had to sign
it to work there."3 In addition to losing certain procedural protec-
tions and remedies, employees like Robin Harris often find that the
arbitrators are ill-suited to decide employment law claims and may be
unsympathetic to employees' allegations. For example, a study of em-
ployer-employee arbitration in the securities industry indicated that
the arbiters were "overwhelmingly white men in their sixties with little
experience in labor law."4
Employers who want to prevent their nonunion employees from
taking them to court have a simple weapon: inserting an arbitration
clause in the employment contract. The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), a statute that Congress originally enacted to enforce arbitra-
I Steven A. Holmes, Securities Arbiters Mostly White Men Over 60, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1994, at B6.
2 Id.
3 Id. A similar situation is presented when an employer requires one or more cur-
rent employees to consent to arbitration of employer-employee disputes as a condition of
continued employment. For example, a Houston, Texas employer is alleged to have im-
posed such a requirement on employees who had complained of gender discrimination to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Margaret A. Jacobs, Arbitration Policy
Faces EEOC Challenge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at B2.
4 Holmes, supra note 1. Commentary has focused on several negative consequences
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims asserted by individuals. See, e.g., Richard E.
Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4
OHIO ST.J. Disp. RE-soL 157, 191-98 (1989) (arbitral procedures are less effective; relative
differences in bargaining power cast doubt on consent to arbitration); Rita M. Cain, Pre-
emption of State Arbitration Statutes: The Exaggerated Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 19 J.
CorrEMP. L 1 (1993) (procedure is biased and unfair);Jenifer A. Magyar, Comment, Stat-
utory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: Analysis ofGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
72 B.U. L. REv. 641, 654-55 (1992) (arbitration denies critical discovery mechanisms; the
arbitral forum thwarts the public interest secured by civil rights laws; the private nature of
arbitration reduces visibility and lessens society's commitment to address civil rights is-
sues); Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 104
HAuv. L. Rv. 568, 583-86 (1990) (arbitration may retard development of age discrimina-
tion doctrine); Mark D. Klimek, Note, Discrimination Claims Under Title VlH Where Mandatory
Arbitration Goes Too Far, 8 OHIO ST.J. Disp. RESOL. 425 (1993).
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don agreements between business persons, gives effect to these
clauses. The Supreme Court, relying on the FAA, has held all types of
arbitration clauses enforceable in state and federal courts. Although
the FAA expressly exempts "contracts of employment" from its scope,5
the courts have nullified this exclusion by interpreting the FAA, para-
doxically, to cover most contracts signed by employees.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.6 extended federal arbitra-
tion law to statutory claims by employees, an area many thought was
protected.7 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court required an employee to
arbitrate a federal age discrimination claim against his employer. The
Court upheld arbitration under the FAA on the grounds that Con-
gress had shown no intention to preclude arbitration when it author-
ized the statutory cause of action. Because the arbitration promise
was in Gilmer's registration application with the New York Stock Ex-
change rather than his contract with Interstate/Johnson Lane, the
Court found it unnecessary to address the scope of the "contracts of
employment" exception in that case.
More recent decisions threaten a further-and doctrinally prob-
lematic-expansion of federal arbitration law into the area of claims
by employees based on state law. Federal and state courts have already
employed at least four different standards to require arbitration of
many state-law employment claims.8 When courts compel arbitration
of state claims, employees forfeit the more advantageous forum that
state law would otherwise guarantee. Although the Supreme Court
has in other contexts recognized that policing the employment rela-
tionship is an important state function, this recent application of fed-
eral arbitration law by lower federal courts and state courts threatens
to undermine employees' ability to vindicate their state-law rights in
court.
This Note analyzes the use of permissive arbitrability standards to
prevent employees from litigating state claims. It contends that the
judiciary's blind deference to the "federal policy favoring arbitration" 9
has resulted in arbitrability standards that skew the analysis too heavily
in favor of arbitration. This approach creates new tensions between
union and nonunion arbitration law. For example, although federal
5 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
6 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
7 See Magyar, supra note 4, at 648. Pre-Gilmer cases had held that arbitration clauses
in collective bargaining agreements did not prevent individual employees from asserting
statutory rights in federal court. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). For a more extensive discussion of Gilmer, see infra part
II.B.
8 See infra part IlIAL.




labor law precludes union employees from asserting some state-law
claims, it also preserves the option to sue in state court when resolving
the claim does not require interpreting a collective bargaining agree-
ment.10 If the pro-arbitration trend continues in the nonunion sec-
tor, however, neither the courts nor a collective bargaining agreement
may protect unrepresented workers. This incongruence in the rules
governing union and nonunion employees is especially important in
light of the fact that collective bargaining is losing significance as a
means of regulating the employment relationship."
Although arbitration has long been common in collective bar-
gaining agreements, it has only recently become significant in the
nonunion setting. The demise of the "at will" employment rule,
which is subject to more and more exceptions under federal and state
law, is an important cause of this change. The permissive nature of
federal arbitration law has also contributed to this shift toward arbitra-
tion of employment law issues. Part L.A of this Note offers an overview
of arbitration in the union and nonunion settings. Federal arbitration
law governing union and nonunion employees has developed along
two different lines: judicial authority to honor arbitration agreements
in union contracts flows from the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA) ;12 for nonunion employment contracts, this authority comes
from the FAA. Parts I.B and 1.C explain the development of the FAA
in the nonunion (or "employment law") context. These sections ar-
gue that the new arbitrability doctrine stretches the FAA beyond its
intended purpose, which was merely to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate disputes involving commercial contracts.
This Note then explains the recent case law governing the arbi-
trability of federal claims by employees. These decisions underlie the
10 See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). For a more
extensive discussion of this preemption doctrine, which is predicated on the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act, see infra notes 324-29 and accompanying text.
11 The number of American workers in the private sector represented by unions has
dropped to approximately 15% of the work force. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely,
Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 363, 377
(1995). For a general discussion of the proposition that the decline in union membership
in the 1980s was especially steep, see MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1987).
Ironically, the erosion of the termination-at-will rule, discussed infra part IA, may have
contributed to union decline. CompareWillard Wirtz, Human Rights and Responsibilities at the
Workplace, 28 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 159 (1991) (public rights are replacing private rights previ-
ously created by collective bargaining) with Nancy R. Hauserman & Cheryl L. Maranto, The
Union Substitution Hypothesis Revisited: DoJudicially Created Exceptions to the Termination-At- Wdl
Doctrine Hurt Unions?, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 317 (1989) (a study of the relationship between
judicially-created exceptions to the termination-at-will rule and changes in union member-
ship indicates that the judicial exceptions have no significant effect on union
membership).
12 For a discussion of § 301 of the LMRA, see infra notes 15-17 and accompanying
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expansion of federal arbitrability principles into the realm of state
claims. To show the relevance of these cases to employment contracts
(as opposed to the third-party contract scenario in Gilmer), Part II.A
discusses the courts' tendency to construe the FAA's "contracts of em-
ployment" exception narrowly. That Part rejects such a narrow view
of the exception, which in any event originated as a creative solution
to an unrelated problem-the lack of any clear statutory basis for en-
forcing collective bargaining agreements. Part II.B then examines Gil-
mer and its progeny, which have yielded compulsory arbitration of a
broad set of federal claims asserted by employees.
Part III analyzes the courts' application of federal arbitration law
to state-law claims asserted by employees. Part III.A analyzes the via-
bility of the competing standards of arbitrability and concludes that
the most permissive standards probably coincide with the Supreme
Court's extreme pro-arbitration posture. Because states have an im-
portant interest in the regulation of employment contracts, however,
courts should not simply assume that Congress intended the FAA to
apply in this context. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's expansive
reading of the FAA presages mandatory arbitration of many employ-
ment cases involving state-law claims.
Part III.B describes two doctrinal tensions that result from this
aggressive approach to arbitrability. First, unlike the Supreme Court's
approach in other areas of law, its approach to arbitrability ignores
the policy prerogatives of states and may thwart states' ability to ad-
dress employment termination in a comprehensive way. Second, it
leads to unjustifiably inconsistent treatment of union and nonunion
workers. Finally, Part III.C contends that the law need not continue
its myopic development. This Note suggests that courts could address
the tension between union and nonunion arbitration law by giving
effect to the "contracts of employment" exception contained in the
FAA and by recognizing that the pro-arbitration policy is not the only
relevant interest in the employment context. Finally, if Congress en-
acts legislation to protect individual employees from compulsory arbi-
tration, such legislation should make clear that it preserves
employees' right to litigate state-law claims as well as federal ones.
I
THE STAGE: ARBITRATION IN UNION AND NONUNION
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
The law governing arbitration in the employment context has de-
veloped along two lines. Where employees are represented by unions,
federal labor laws apply. Where employees have contracted individu-
ally, the more general laws governing arbitration apply. The Federal
Arbitration Act is the centerpiece of arbitration law in all areas except
1698 [Vol. 80:1695
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"labor law" and controls whether individual employees must arbitrate
disputes with their employers.' 3 This Part discusses the development
of arbitration law in these two contexts and examines the courts' ex-
pansive reading of the FAA.
A. Overview: Arbitration and the Divergence of "Labor" and
"Employment" Law
Arbitration 14 has become the primary means of resolving labor
contract disputes since the Supreme Court decided the famous Steel-
workers Trilogy in 1960.15 The Trilogy requires federal courts to en-
force arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA).16 Arbi-
13 This distinction is consistent with the more general divergence of "labor law" and
'employment law," as reflected in the tendency among American law schools to teach the
subjects in different courses. See STEvEN L. WILIBORN Er AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW vii (1993).
As is generally true of these fields, however, there is significant overlap in the rules gov-
erning arbitration. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40
n.9 (1987) (indicating that the FAA is a persuasive source in the determination of substan-
tive federal law governing arbitration clauses in union contracts); Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Asociacion de Empleados de Casino de Puerto Rico, 873 F.2d 479, 482 (1989)
(borrowing the FAA limitations period for purposes of vacating an arbitral award under
§ 301 of the LMRA).
14 "An arbitrator is a neutral third party who renders a decision between two contend-
ing parties who cannot mutually arrive at a satisfactory resolution of their conflict." DouG-
IAS M. MCCABE, CORPORATE NONUNION COMPLAINT PROCEDURES AND" SYSTEMS 65 (1988).
Employers are also interested in nonjudicial dispute resolution techniques other than arbi-
tration. For example, mediation, in which "a neutral third party who, while lacking author-
ity to render a decision, assists the parties in achieving one of their own choice," offers a
potential alternative to arbitration. Id. This Note does not address the legal implication,
of such alternatives to arbitration. The reader should keep in mind, however, that there
may be no clear line between arbitration and other types of ADR. Some commentators
have stressed that mediation is or should be one of the arbitrator's primary tasks. See, e.g.,
Vincent Fischer-Zernin & AbboJunker, Arbitration and Mediation: Synthesis orAntithesis, 5J.
INT'L ARu. 21, 22 (1988) ("[T]he realization that mediation is one of the functions of
arbitration should be the future trend.").
Although employers in the United States have displayed an interest in arbitration only
relatively recently, the technique has ancient roots. See FRANK Eiutouiu & EDNA AsPER
ELKoumi, How ARBrrRATION Womcs 2 (4th ed. 1985) (noting that Phillip II of Macedon
insisted on arbitration to resolve disputes under a treaty drafted in approximately 338-337
B.C.).
15 The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960) (requiring enforcement of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement without reference to the merits of the dispute), United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (requiring district courts to resolve any doubts
concerning arbitrability under a collective bargaining agreement in favor of arbitrability),
and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 863 U.S. 593 (1960) (requiring
judicial enforcement of an arbitral award without reference to the merits).
16 Section 801(a) of the LMRA, or the Taft-Hartley Act, provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
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tration became prevalent in the union setting because it was an effi-
cient means of settling the myriad of disputes that can arise under a
private collective bargaining agreement.' 7 In the context of employ-
ment contracts involving no bargaining representative, however, arbi-
tration is still in its infancy.
Two related factors have contributed to the incongruence be-
tween arbitration of disputes under labor contracts and individual em-
ployment contracts. The first factor is the termination-at-will
employment doctrine.' 8 The traditional rule in American contract
law is that an employer may discharge an employee for any reason or
for no reason at all. 19 Employers traditionally have not been inter-
ested in agreeing to arbitrate disputes with employees-a promise to
arbitrate can create liability where the at-will rule imposes none.20
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citi-
zenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
17 See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CH.-
KENT L. REv. 753, 754 (1990) ("Virtually every collective bargaining agreement contains a
formal grievance system culminating in arbitration before an outside neutral.").
18 The Tennessee Supreme Court once described the traditional "at will" employ-
ment rule in the following way.
All may dismiss their employes [sic] at will, be they many or few, for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong.... The sufficient and conclusive answer to the many
plausible arguments to the contrary, portraying the evil to workmen and to
others from the exercise of such authority by the great and strong, is: They
have the right to discharge their employes [sic]. The law cannot compel
them to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed.
Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
19 See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL Hisr. 118, 131 (1976) (tracing the development of the termination-at-will rule and
viewing it as a component of the development of capitalism in the United States); cf Stew-
artJ. Schwab, Life-CydeJustice: AccommodatingJust Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MIcH. L
Rrv. 8 (1993) (arguing that courts have modified the at-will employment doctrine to give
employees protection early and late in their careers, when the danger of employer "oppor-
tunism" is the greatest).
20 Such unintended liability can arise, for example, when an employer creates a griev-
ance procedure unilaterally by incorporating it in an employee handbook. See, e.g., Renny
v. Port Huron Hosp., 398 N.W.2d 327, 336 (Mich. 1986) ("The fact that defendant hospital
followed the grievance procedure [established in its employment manual] is evidence that
a just-cause contract existed upon which plaintiff had legitimately relied."); Zeniuk v.
RK.A., Inc., 472 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (enforcing an arbitration provision in
an employee manual).
Moreover, courts may scrutinize the dispute resolution procedure in such situations
and allow employees to sue in state court notwithstanding a prior unfavorable arbitration
award. See, e.g., Renny, 398 N.W.2d at 339 ("This lack of elementary fairness in the proce-
dures utilized entitled plaintiff to submit the merits of her claim to the jury to determine if,
in fact, she was fired for just cause."). Other courts, however, have felt that employees
whose employers publish employee manuals must "take the bitter with the sweet" and that
employers can prescribe dispute resolution procedures without court intervention. See,
e.g., Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1076 (Md. C. App. 1991) ("Subur-
ban's policy set out the procedures Dwiggins was entitled to have followed. Dwiggins is not
1700 [Vol. 80:1695
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The second factor that helps explain the relative rarity of arbitra-
tion agreements in the nonunion context is federal law itself. Federal
courts' authority to enforce arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements has its source in section 301 of the LMRA. On its face the
LMRA merely confers jurisdiction over suits for breaches of collective
bargaining agreements.2' In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, however,
the Supreme Court construed the statute broadly, inferring a substan-
tive law favoring arbitration from the policies underlying the LMRA. 22
The authority derived from this reading applies to collective bargain-
ing contracts but not to individual employment contracts. 23
Federal law governs the arbitrability of nonunion employment
contracts, if at all, through the FAA.24 The FAA requires federal and
state courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate that fall within its
reach, and the Supreme Court has used the Act to fashion a federal
substantive law of arbitrability.2 5 Although the FAA itself purports to
exclude employment contracts from its coverage,2 6 courts have often
construed the "contracts of employment" clause narrowly.2 7 Nonethe-
less, the extent of arbitration in the nonunion sector has not matched
the influence of arbitration in labor law.
This picture is changing, however, because the formerly at-will
nature of individual employment contracts is riddled with exceptions.
For example, state courts have held that employee handbooks can cre-
ate implied contractual obligations.28 States have also imposed statu-
tory exceptions to at-will employment.2 9 Moreover, several federal
entitled to have the court impose additional requirements. Dwiggins was still an at-will
employee.").
21 See supra note 16 (full text of § 301 (a)).
22 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
23 Section 301 of the LMRA confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear
cases involving a breach of a collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 16. The Steel-
workers Trilogy demonstrates that enforcing arbitration clauses is an important part of that
substantive law. See supra note 15. But because § 301 does not give federal courts jurisdic-
tion to hear cases between individual employees and their employers, these decisions do
not require courts to enforce arbitration agreements outside the collective bargaining
setting.
24 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994).
25 See discussion infra part I.C.
26 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see also infra text accompanying note 43.
27 See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text (discussing some courts' narrow read-
ing of the clause excluding "contracts of employment" from the reach of the FAA).
28 Examples ofjudicially-created exceptions to the employment-at-will rule are found
in contract law, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
(holding that a provision in an employee manual prohibiting discharge except for cause
created an enforceable promise), and in tort law, e.g., Paige v. HenryJ. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d
857 (9th Cir. 1987) (state tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed
when employees alleged they were discharged for failing to fill gasoline tanks under unsafe
conditions), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988).
29 The clearest example may be the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act of 1987, MoNT. CODE Am. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (1993) (requiring "good cause" for
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statutes, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, effectively limit
employers' ability to mistreat or fire employees.30 These limitations
on at-will employment provide more opportunities for courts to inter-
vene in the private employment relationship. Faced with these legal
constraints and the relatively high cost of litigation,31 many employers
prefer other methods of dispute resolution.32 Arbitration, in which
the parties submit the dispute to an impartial arbitrator with binding
authority, is the preferred method.33
When an employee whose contract requires arbitration sues her
employer, the court must determine "arbitrability."3 4 Since the
discharge). More common are antidiscrimination provisions such as the Missouri Human
Rights Act, see infra note 255. The Model Employment Termination Act would abolish the
at-will rule altogether for most employees. Model Employment Termination Act §§ 1-14,
7A U.LA 75 (West Supp. 1995). Like the Montana statute, however, the model law limits
damages available to employees. See WILLB RN Er AL., supra note 13, at 255 ("The tradeoff
is similar to the classic one underlying workers' compensation laws: more sure recovery of
smaller damages.").
30 E.g., Family and Medical Leave Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 6381-6387 (1994); National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-2009 (1988); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2109 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
31 Gerald P. Cunningham, Arbitration Provisions in Employee Handbooks: What California
Employers Should Know, LA. LAw., June 1988, at 59, 59 ("Employers generally have three
basic concerns with respect to employment-related litigation: 1) the potential adverse deci-
sion by a (possibly biased) jury, with exposure to punitive damages awards; 2) the disrup-
tion to employees and supervisors inherent in ongoing litigation; and 3) costs of
litigation.").
32 Cf Jacobs, supra note 3, at B2 ("[A] growing number of companies-trying to re-
duce litigation costs and bypass antibias laws-are requiring employees to sign arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment or promotion."); Employers Reluctant to Embrace
Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 84, at A-15 (Apr. 30, 1992)
("Despite their concern over Gilmer, most employers favor the use of alternative dispute
resolution or ADR .... ."). Despite employer interest in arbitration in the non-union envi-
ronment, however, research indicates that employers are proceeding with caution. For
example, as Professor McCabe, supra note 14, at 75, reports:
[O]f 78 companies' employee-relations manuals reviewed, only six, or less
than 8 percent, permit arbitration. If the two companies that permit arbi-
tration only in the case of an employee's discharge are subtracted... only 5
percent... may be said to provide arbitration as a means for the resolving
of employees' grievances.
33 Employers Resolve Worker Complaints Through Alternatives to Litigation, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1, at A-5 (Jan. 2, 1992).
34 If the dispute has already been arbitrated, the court might be called on to decide
whether to enforce or vacate the arbitral award. However, because judicial review of arbi-
tration awards is highly deferential, see infra note 224, it typically amounts to determining
whether or not a dispute was arbitrable at the outset.
Courts use the terms "arbitrable" and "arbitrability" to describe two distinct aspects of
a claim: (1) whether the claim is within the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate
and (2) whether the claim is of a type that is susceptible to arbitration as a matter of public
1702 [Vol. 80:1695
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landmark Gilmer decision, federal courts frequently have invoked the
FAA to require arbitration of federal statutory claims against employ-
ers.35 Additionally, courts are now deciding the arbitrability of state-
law claims against employers under the FAA. But ambiguity in the
Gilmer decision, coupled with the increasingly broad federal common-
law of arbitration premised on the FAA, has led to divergent standards
of arbitrability in the state-law cases, all of which most often lead to
arbitration. This Note evaluates those standards and argues that they
lead to an improper expansion of the FAA.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
Private agreements to resolve disputes through arbitration were
viewed with suspicion by common lawjudges.36 In 1925, Congress en-
acted the FAA, so that "where there are commercial contracts and
there is disagreement under the contract,... court[s] can [en]force
policy or under an applicable arbitration statute. See Thomas E. Carbonneau & Frangois
Janson, Cartesian Logic and Frontier Politics: French and American Concepts of Arbitrability, 2 TuL
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 193, 195 (1994) (distinguishing "contractual" and "substantive" inarbi-
trability). Although arbitration "promises" by employees often implicate the former con-
cern, this Note focuses on the latter aspect of the problem.
35 See discussion infra part I.B.
36 Before arbitration statutes appeared in the early twentieth century, courts generally
refused to enforce arbitration promises unless an arbitral award had already been ren-
dered. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451-53 (1874) (Arbitration agree-
ments "oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law."); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v.
Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (the basis for the rule is
questionable but stare decisis requires it); Lewis v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 79 N.E. 802,
803 (Mass. 1907) (A contractual term referring disputes to arbitration "is void as an at-
tempt to oust the courts of [their] jurisdiction."); Whitney v. National Masonic Accident
Ass'n, 54 N.W. 184, 185 (Minn. 1893) ("The rule is so well settled... that it is needless to
consider the various reasons which have been assigned for it."); Pepin v. Societe St. Jean
Baptiste, 49 A. 387, 388 (R.I. 1901) (Prospective waiver of ajudicial forum by agreement to
arbitrate violates public policy.). This posture followed a long tradition in English courts.
See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Tilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REv. 1305, 1309 (1985) ("English courts refused to enforce arbitration contracts on
the ground that 'an agreement of the parties cannot oust [the] court' of its jurisdiction.")
(citing Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532 (KB. 1746)); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (reviewing the history of British courts'
treatment of arbitration agreements; concluding that judicial suspicion of arbitration
originated as a means of protecting judges' incomes).
For an early look at the problem, see Juuus HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
AND THE LAW 281 (1918):
Why should such a movement be hampered by the continuance of a rule
unsound in public policy, bad in legal theory, obsolete historically and un-
supported by sound legal precedent? Only lack of true information has
kept it alive so long. But "Ignorantia Legis Neminem Excasat." (Ignorance of
the Law excuses no man[.]) This includes the Lawyer and the Judge, does
it not?
Id. at 281. Cohen was an active member of the American Bar Association who pushed for
judicial recognition of arbitral agreements among business persons.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
an arbitration agreement in the same way as other portions of the
contract."37
The FAA provides for the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
contracts "involving commerce."38 The "core" of the statute is in sec-
tions 2 through 4.39 Section 2 makes such arbitration clauses "valid,
37 65 CONG. REc. 11,080 (1924) (Rep. Mills of New York, speaking in favor of H.R.
646). Earlier that year, in an unsuccessful attempt to pass H.R. 646 from the House Con-
sent Calendar, Representative Graham of Pennsylvania described the bill in the following
way:
This bill is one prepared in answer to a great demand for the correction of
what seems to be an anachronism in our law, inherited from English juris-
prudence. Originally, agreements to arbitrate, the English courts refused
to enforce, jealous of their own power and because it would oust the juris-
diction of the courts. That has come into our law with the common law
from England. This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an
opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admi-
ralty contracts-an agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the
document by the parties to it. It does not involve any new principle of law
except to provide a simple method by which the parties may be brought
before the court in order to give enforcement to that which they have al-
ready agreed to. It does not affect any contract that has not the agreement
in it to arbitrate, and only gives the opportunity after personal service of
asking the parties to come in and carry through, in good faith, what they
have agreed to. It does nothing more than that. It creates no new legisla-
tion, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.
65 CONG. REC. 1,931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
38 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section one defines "commerce":
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies fur-
nished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in for-
eign commerce which, if the subject of a controversy, would be embraced
within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein defined, means com-
merce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory
of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
Territory and another, or between such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or
foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Id. § 1.
39 Archibald Cox used the word "core" in Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the
Federal Courts, 67 HAv. L. REv. 591, 591-92 (1954) (referring to the United States Arbitra-
tion Act). The current versions of sections 2 through 4 provide:
§ 2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transac-
tion, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
§ 3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writ-
ing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon be-
ing satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
1704 [Vol. 80:1695
1995] NOTE-STATLAW CLAIMS 1705
irrevocable, and enforceable," except "upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."40 Section 3 re-
quires courts to stay a trial on an issue subject to arbitration under a
contract, pending arbitral resolution of the issue.4' Section 4 allows a
contracting party to apply to a federal district court for an order com-
pelling arbitration when the other party fails to arbitrate.42
Section 1 is of particular relevance in the employment context. It
defines the term "commerce" for purposes of the Act and contains the
provision that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."43 This lan-
guage, which clearly excludes arbitration clauses contained in at least
some employment contracts, has often been interpreted narrowly.44
Statements by the bill's author on the floor of the House of Rep-
resentatives indicate that the driving force behind the FAA was the
common law's refusal to enforce private agreements to arbitrate, even
when the agreement was between two parties of equal bargaining
power.45 An American Bar Association (ABA) committee drafted the
original version of the bill. 46 Reports accompanying the original draft
arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
§ 4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States court
having jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and service
thereof, hearing and determination
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbi-
trate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States dis-
trict court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28,
in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration pro-
ceed in the manner provided for in such agreement... The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration
or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement... Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default
may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of
application, demand a jury trial of such issue ....
9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (1994).
40 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
4' Id. §3.
42 Id. § 4.
43 Id. § 1.
44 See discussion infta part Hl.A.
45 See supra note 37.
46 See Report of Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, 47 A.BA REP. 288,
293-94 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 ABA Committee Report]. With the lobbying assistance of
Secretary of Commerce Hoover, see id. at 293, the FAA was first introduced by Senator
Sterling and Representative Mills as S. 4214 and H.R. 13522 in the 67th Congress on De-
cember 20, 1922. See Report of Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, 48 A.B.A.
REP. 284, 286 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 ABA Committee Report].
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indicate that the ABA sought to expedite the resolution of commer-
cial disputes.47 The ABA modelled the bill after substantially similar
statutes that state legislatures had already enacted, such as the New
York Arbitration Law.48 Although the state statutes were written in
broad terms, commentary on the federal bill by the ABA49 and by aca-
demic commentators50 strongly suggests that the drafters did not in-
tend the legislation to reach anything but disputes between business
persons over commercial contracts. The tenor of the testimony taken
at committee hearings strongly suggests that legislators did not think
47 The testimony received.., at the public sessions... confirms... that there
is a great satisfaction on the part of business men with the principles and
procedure of the New York Law and that it is desired that these principles
should be made effective in interstate commerce, intrastate commerce and
foreign commerce.... [Adoption of arbitration statutes] will raise the stan-
dards of commercial ethics. It will reduce litigation. It will enable business
men to settle their disputes expeditiously and economically, and will reduce
the congestion in the federal and state courts.
1922 ABA Committee Report, supra note 46, at 293-95.
48 J.P. Chamberlain, Current Legislation: The CommercialArbitration Law, 9 A.B.A.J. 523,
524 (1923) ("The act [proposed by the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Com-
mercial Law] follows the New York statute with few modifications."). The provisions of
Article II of the New York arbitration statute are much like the federal statute that eventu-
ally passed. See 1920 N.Y. Lws 803 (New York Arbitration Law).
49 Cf Chamberlain, supra note 48, at 524 (indicating that the New York statute was
initiated by the Chamber of Commerce). Chamberlain's article did not completely clarify
the ABA's position on the desired reach of the FAA. The author did note, however, that
state statutes varied in their scope, and that certain types of disputes were not amenable to
arbitration:
It would indeed be difficult to provide by agreement in advance that any
tort action should also be referred to arbitration. For example, it would be
practically impossible and unfair to the passenger to compel a passenger on
a railway to agree, not to sue, but to submit to arbitration his claims for an
injury in the course of the carrying out of his contract of transportation
with the railway company. There is no central point at which the passenger
and the company can conveniently meet before the arbitrators, and the
questions involved in such an action are fault, extent of injury, and prob-
able loss which it is much safer to leave to ajury than are the questions of
custom of the trade or quality of goods involved in disputes arising over
business contracts.
Id. at 525.
50 For example, Chamberlain claimed that business persons preferred to have certain
facts determined by experts rather than by juries. Chamberlain, supra note 48, at 523 n.1
(citing Moses H. Grossman, Speeding up Justice Through Arbitration, 5 11. L.Q. 135 (1923)).
Grossman's article noted that arbitrators can have expertise in "the particular field of busi-
ness in which the dispute has arisen." Grossman, supra, at 137. Grossman also contended
that arbitration is superior where "an issue depends upon a question of trade custom or
practice" and where "revelation of trade secrets or confidential matters" would be damag-
ing in a public forum. Id.; see also Hollis R. Bailey, Arbitration, 8 MAss. L.Q. 55 (1923) ("In
1918 at the Conference of Bar Association delegates held at Cleveland under the auspices
of the American Bar Association, a movement was started in favor of legislation by which
agreements for arbitration should be made binding ... as a means for settling speedily all
kinds of disputes arising in business transactions."). But cf. Comment, Arbitration Contracts,
33 YALE LJ. 90, 92 (1923-24) (discussing the common law of arbitration and noting that
the New York statute applies to "all agreements to arbitrate, if language appropriate for
that purpose is used").
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the bill would reach other types of disputes.51 This understanding is
confirmed by the reaction of the bill's proponents to the FAA's
passage.52
C. "Pro-Arbitration Policy"-The Judiciary's Expansion of the
FAA
The language of the FAA does not clearly define the statute's
reach.53 A series of Supreme Court decisions has resolved much of
this ambiguity in favor of a broad interpretation of the FAA as pre-
emptive of state law and as representative of a strong substantive pol-
icy favoring arbitration. This Part briefly traces the legal doctrine that
set the stage for Gilmer.
Interpretive questions arose primarily in diversity cases because
courts have never held that the FAA creates federal question jurisdic-
tion.54 The Supreme Court initially avoided federalism questions by
construing the FAA narrowly.55 In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., a Ver-
mont citizen sued his employer in state court for damages resulting
from his discharge.56 Norman Bernhardt had been hired to supervise
a lithography plant in North Bennington, Vermont, and his contract
51 See infta notes 124-32.
52 ABA members who drafted the bill and lobbied for it in Congress wrote the
following:
The bill was supported by business organizations from every part of the coun-
try.... At a time when the Bar is charged with lack of appreciation of the
needs of business in modeling legal procedure, what greater answer to the
criticism can be made than that the American Bar Association, with the
support of the business men of the country, prepared and... secured[ ] the
enactment into law of a policy... providing a machinery so simple that it
requires only the action by trade bodies throughout the country and of busi-
hess men generally to make its application effective?
W.H.H. Piattet al., The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 153
(1925) (emphasis added).
53 See generally Hirshman, supra note 36, at 1318 ("[W]hen Congress acted in 1925 to
redress the undesirable consequences of the deep-rooted common-law hostility to arbitra-
tion, it unknowingly created problems of interpretation and application that implicate fun-
damental federalism concerns. Courts and commentators have been wrestling with these
difficulties ever since.").
54 See id. at 1318-19 (citing, inter alia, Robert Lawrences Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271
F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959)). The Supreme Court endorsed this view in Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1982) ("The Arbitra-
tion Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-courtjurisdiction. It creates a
body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement
to arbitrate, yet it does not create an independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 ....- ).
55 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (holding that a con-
tract between a lithography company and its plant supervisor is not a contract "in" com-
merce and that the FAA therefore does not apply).
56 Id. at 199.
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contained an arbitration clause. 57 The employer removed the action
to federal court on diversity grounds5s and moved for a stay pending
arbitration. On the basis of state law, the district court denied the
employer's motion.59 The Second Circuit reversed on the ground
that the stay provision in section 3 of the FAA was a mandatory proce-
dural rule applicable in all federal proceedings-notjust ones involv-
ing interstate commerce-and indicated that section 3 did not violate
the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins60 because it was not
"substantive.' 6 1
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, avoided
the potential Erie problem by "read [ing section 3 of the FAA] narrowly
to avoid that issue." 62 Consequently, the Court reversed, holding that
Bernhardt's contract was not one involving commerce and was there-
fore not covered by the FAA.65 The Court manifested its reluctance to
address the constitutional implications by taking the position that
reading the FAA's stay provision as "procedural" might impermissibly
intrude on local law. 64 According to the Court, such an interpretation
would have created outcome-determinative problems, contravening
the command of Eie.65 Justice Douglas's opinion therefore indicated
that the FAA requirement was a substantive one.6 6
Justice Douglas's opinion in Bernhardt suggested in dicta that arbi-
tration leads to both a different and inferior result.67 The Court later
repudiated its suspicion of the arbitral forum and relied on the "sub-
stantive" nature of the FAA to fashion a body of federal arbitration law
57 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948, 949-50 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd on
other grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 949.
60 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61 Bernhardt, 218 F.2d at 951.
62 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202. For a discussion of federalism questions presented by
the FAA, see THoMAs E. C BONN.AU, ALTERNATVE DisPUTE REsOLUTION: MELTING THE
LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 107-10 (1989).
65 Bernhardt 350 U.S. at 200-01 ("There is no showing that petitioner while perform-
ing his duties under the employment contract was working 'in' commerce, was producing
goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce .. .
64 Id. at 202.
65 Id. at 203-04.
66 Id. at 202-03.
67 The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical
difference in ultimate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury
that is guaranteed both by the Seventh Amendment and... the Vermont
Constitution. Arbitrators do not have the benefit ofjudicial instruction on
the law; they need not give the reasons for their results; the record of their
proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; andjudicial review of
an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial ....
Id. As if those reasons were insufficient, Justice Douglas added seven more differences in a
footnote. Id. at 208 n.4.
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that would preempt state law.68 Thus, Justice Douglas's characteriza-
tion of the FAA as "substantive," which in Bernhardt limited the FAA's
reach, opened the door for later expansion of the Act.
In 1966, overJustice Douglas's dissent,69 the Court in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing held that a defense of fraud in
the making of a contract containing an arbitration promise was arbi-
trable under the FAA. 70 The parties had entered into a contract
under which Prima Paint would acquire Flood & Conklin's opera-
tions.71 The agreement contained a broad arbitration clause. 72 Prima
Paint sued in federal court for rescission, and Flood & Conklin moved
for a stay pending arbitration. 73 The Supreme Court invoked a fed-
eral rule-that an arbitration clause is analytically separable from the
rest of the contract-to hold the arbitration clause enforceable. 74
The Court based the authority to fashion a federal rule on the theory
that Congress exercised its commerce and admiralty powers when it
enacted the FAA.75 This resolved the Erie problem articulated in Bern-
hardt76 and laid a firm foundation for the development of a federal
law governing arbitration.77
In 1982, the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.78 further entrenched the pro-arbitration
68 See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text. Another twist is thatJustice Douglas
would soon write the Steelworkers opinions, see supra note 15, which contain nearly zealous
praise of arbitration in the industrial relations context.
69 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 425 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting, joined by Douglas and StewartJ.J.) ("The plain purpose of the [FAA] as written
by Congress was this and no more: Congress wanted federal courts to enforce contracts to
arbitrate and plainly said so in the Act .... I am completely unable to agree to this new
version of the Arbitration Act, a version which its own creator in Robert Lawrence practically
admitted was judicial legislation.").
70 388 U.S. at 406-07 (Fortas, J., writing for the majority).
71 Id. at 397.
72 Id. at 398.
73 Id. at 399.
74 Id. at 403-04. Thus, unless the allegation of fraud is directed specifically at the
arbitration clause, the clause is valid and the parties must arbitrate the question of whether
the entire contract was induced by fraud. Id. at 402. For an extensive comparative analysis
of the doctrine of separability, see Sojuznefteexport v. Joc Oil Ltd., 4 Int'l Arb. Rep. B1-86
(Bermuda Ct. App. 1989), in 15 YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 384 (1990).
75 Prima Pain4 388 U.S. at 405.
76 Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart preferred a more modest resolution: that the
state courts' substantive rule of decision should determine the outcome. See id. at 411
(BlackJ., dissenting). This view apparently repudiates the Bernhardt dictum that the FAA is
not simply a procedural rule for federal courts. Cf id. at 411 (disapproving the view that
"the Arbitration Act, designed to provide merely a procedural remedy which would not
interfere with state substantive law, authorizes federal courts to fashion a federal rule to
make arbitration clauses 'separable' and valid").
77 See generally Hirshman, supra note 36, at 1321-24 (discussing Prima Paint and its
ramifications); CARBONNEAU, supra note 62, at 108 (Prima Paint "has seminal
significance.").
78 460 U.S. 1 (1982).
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policy premised on the FAA. A dispute over the performance of a
construction contract had led to two actions: the petitioner, a hospi-
tal, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in state court to avoid arbi-
tration, and the respondent contractor filed suit in federal court for
an order compelling arbitration under the FAA. The federal district
court ordered a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of the
state litigation. The Supreme Court held that the district court
abused its discretion under the doctrine of deference to pending state
court actions established in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States.79 The Moses H. Cone majority reasoned that the "excep-
tional circumstances" required for abstention under Colorado River did
not exist on the facts before the district court.80
Moses H. Cone, in performing the free-form interest analysis re-
quired by Colorado River, announced various principles of federal arbi-
tration law as relevant "factors" in determining whether the federal
court should abstain.8 ' The Court endorsed these specific proposi-
tions: that the presence of a nonsignatory third party does not pre-
clude arbitrability;8 2 that the FAA applies in state courts as well as in
federal courts;8 3 that the FAA "declar[es] ... a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements";8 4 that the FAA creates a presump-
tion of arbitrability;8 5 and that the FAA creates substantive federal
rules even though it cannot independently support federal question
jurisdiction.8 6 According to the Court, this array of principles fol-
lowed from the "substantive law of arbitrability" created by the FAA.8 7
A year later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,88 the Court resolved any
doubts concerning the applicability of the FAA in state proceedings.
There, several franchisees sued a franchisor on state-law theories, in-
cluding a claim that the franchisor had violated disclosure require-
ments of the California Franchise Investment Law.89 The California
Supreme Court held that the state claims were not arbitrable, despite
a provision in the franchise agreement for arbitration of "[a]ny con-
79 See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13-26. Colorado River is reported at 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
80 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25-26.
81 Id. at 13-28.
82 Id. at 20.
83 Id. at 24. However, the Court did not decide whether § 4 of the FAA applies in
state court. Id. at 26; see supra note 39 (full text of § 4).
84 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
85 Id. at 24-25. The liberal federal policy suddenly becomes less liberal-and the pre-
sumption is reversed-when there is a dispute over whether the arbitrators or the courts
are to decide the question of arbitrability. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115
S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995).
86 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
87 Id. at 24 (citing the Prima Paint rule as an example).
88 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
89 Id. at 4.
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troversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [a] greement or the
breach hereof."90
The United States Supreme Court reversed, striking down a pro-
vision in the California franchise statute that invalidated waivers of
rights to litigate claims arising under state law on the ground that the
provision violated the Supremacy Clause. The Court explained that
"[iln creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal
courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to un-
dercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 91
More recently, the Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dob-
son9 2 declined to overrule Southland, thus reaffirming that the FAA is
preemptive and applies in state courts, and held that the FAA extends
to all contracts that are subject to the commerce power.
Southland and Allied-Bruce Terminix demonstrate the Court's ten-
dency to ignore evidence of congressional intent in deciding FAA
questions.93 The FAA's authors stated only that the bill was intended
to give an opportunity to "enforce an [arbitration] agreement in com-
mercial contracts and in admiralty contracts . . . when voluntarily
placed in the document by the parties" and that it "grant[ed] no new
rights."94 Likewise, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her Southland
dissent, the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress did not
90 Id. at 4, 17.
91 Id. at 16.
92 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the Court enforced an arbitration
clause in a home extermination contract on the basis that the contract "turn[ed] out, in
fact, to have involved interstate commerce." Id. at 841-43. In so doing, it reversed ajudg-
ment of the Alabama high court, which had held the FAA inapplicable because the parties
had not contemplated that interstate commerce would be involved when they entered into
the agreement. Id. at 841. In determining that the FAA's reach coincides with that of the
commerce clause, the Court read the words "a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce" in § 2 as equivalent to the expansive "affecting commerce" language found in
other statutes. Id. at 839.
Justice O'Connor, without repudiating her powerful dissent in the Southland case,
agreed with the majority's commerce analysis and opined that stare decisis precludes the
overruling of Southland. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote in dissent that the FAA-which was enacted
only as a procedural provision-was intended to apply only in federal courts. Id. at 848. In
addition to persuasively analyzing the FAA's history, Justice Thomas's dissent emphasizes
federalism concerns and the related presumption against reading a statute to displace state
law. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)).
93 See, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Terminix,
115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) ("[O]ver the past decade, the Court has aban-
doned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.").
94 See 65 CONG. Rc. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham). For the full text, see
supra note 37.
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intend for the FAA to produce the broad substantive rules announced
in Prima Paint and its progeny.95
The plain language of the FAA is consistent with a narrower un-
derstanding of its scope. For example, section 2 allows for an excep-
tion to arbitrability "upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."96 This clause suggests that state sub-
stantive rules should still have effect in evaluating whether the parties
have made a valid agreement to arbitrate. In addition, the remedial
provisions in sections 3 and 4 apply respectively to "courts of the
United States" and "United States district court[s]." 97 These provi-
sions indicate that Congress intended the FAA to apply only in federal
trial and appellate courts, not in state courts. Despite evidence of
Congress's contrary intent,98 the Court has created an amorphous
"body of federal substantive law."99 As Justice O'Connor recognized
in her Southland dissent, the source of the problem is Bernhardts asser-
tion that a right to arbitration is "substantive." 100
The resulting expansion of federal arbitration law, unintended in
Bernhardt,1° 1 strongly parallels the labor-law arbitrability decisions pre-
mised on section 301 of the LMRA. 10 2 The labor arbitration cases, set
95 Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Th[e FAA's legislative] his-
tory establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute,
applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal
power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts."). For example, the House report
accompanying the version reaching the House floor indicated that "[w]hether an agree-
ment for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure." H.R. REP. No.
96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). For excerpts from the hearings on the bill to the same
effect, see infra note 313 and accompanying text. Because the FAA was enacted before Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins took away Congress's power to prescribe "general" common law to be
followed in diversity cases, see Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), these comments imply that Congress
did not intend to displace state substantive rules as the Court held in the Prima Paint-
Keating line of cases.
96 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see supra note 39 (full text of § 2).
97 See supra note 39 (full text of §§ 3-4).
98 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Plainly, a power derived
from Congress' Art[icle] III control over federal-court jurisdiction would not by any flight
of fancy permit Congress to control proceedings in state courts.").
99 Id. at 12 (majority opinion) (quoting Moss H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 & n.32 (1982)).
100 Id. at 26 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). And, asJustice Thomas more recently pointed
out in dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix, the Court's characterization of § 3 of the FAA as
"substantive" for Erie purposes in 1956 could not have changed the meaning of the FAA,
which was enacted in 1925. 115 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101 This proposition is supported by the fact that Justice Douglas, who authored the
majority opinion in Bernhardt,joinedJustice Black's dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 425 (1966). See supra note 69.
102 The similarities led Professor Hirshman to name three critical FAA cases in the
1980s the "Second Trilogy." See Hirshman, supra note 36 (referring to Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1982); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1983); and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
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in motion byJustice Douglas's majority opinion in Lincoln Mills,103 rely
on section 301 of the LMRA 10 4 to infer the authority of "federal courts
to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collec-
tive bargaining agreements."' 05
The "substantive" law of section 301, however, is more justifiable
than that of the FAA. First, the FAA preceded Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,10 6 section 301 followed Erie.10 7 Pre-Erie law allowed Con-
gress to prescribe substantive rules of decision for diversity cases, and
thus statements in the legislative history of the FAA indicating that the
FAA was "procedural" in nature strongly suggest that Congress in-
tended no federal "substantive" law of arbitration. Congress had no-
tice of the Erie decision when it enacted the LMRA, however, and the
section 301 (a) procedural provisions would have meant little without
an implied substantive law.'08
Second, section 301 "substantive" law is arguably less intrusive on
states' interests because it is inherently limited to the collective bar-
gaining context. 10 9 The FAA, on the other hand, may potentially
reach almost all other contractual situations, given the Court's expan-
sive interpretation of the commerce clause and its revisionist view that
Congress enacted the FAA under its commerce clause power.110
Third, as Part III.B of this Note explains, the Court has shown
more restraint in labor arbitration cases, by inferring congressional
deference to state prerogatives when Congress enacts a broad substan-
tive policy like that embodied in the LMRA."' This Note contends
103 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 16 (full text of § 301(a)).
105 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451 (1957). Section 301 itself, of course, does notspeak in
such clear terms. See supra note 16.
106 304 U.S. 64 (1988).
107 Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, see supra part I.B.; the Supreme Court decided
Erie in 1938, 304 U.S. 64 (1958); and Congress enacted the LMRA in 1947, 61 Stat. 136
(1947).
108 Cf Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51:
There is one view that § 301(a) merely gives federal district courts jurisdic-
tion in controversies that involve labor organizations in industries affecting
commerce, without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount in con-
troversy. Under that view § 301(a) would not be the source of substantive
law; it would neither supply federal law to resolve these controversies nor
turn the federal judges to state law for answers to the questions. Other
courts-the overwhelming number of them-hold that § 301(a) is more
than jurisdictional-that it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements
109 See supra note 16 (text of§301(a)).
110 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1966) (indicat-
ing that the commerce power supported enactment of the FAA). For legislative history
strongly suggesting that this was not intended, however, see infra note 313.
III See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
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that courts should use the same general approach when interpreting
the FAA, instead of dogmatically invoking the "liberal policy" favoring
arbitration.
II
ARBITRATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
UNDER THE FAA
Two features of federal arbitration law allow employers to force
employees to arbitrate. First, although the FAA explicitly excludes
"contracts of employment" from its scope, many courts have relied on
obsolete case law to hold that the Act reaches all but a small set of
employees. These cases involved employer-union disputes and arose
before the 1957 Lincoln Mills decision broadly interpreted the LMRA
to create a substantive federal law governing collective bargaining
agreements. The pre-Lincoln Mills cases used the FAA to achieve a
similar goal, but in so doing did violence to the FAA provision exclud-
ing employment contracts. Second, the recent Gilmer decision pre-
cluded an employee from litigating an employment discrimination
claim against his employer.112 These two lines of authority have al-
lowed employers to avoid litigation of a variety of claims by employees.
A. War is Peace: Interpretation of the "Contracts of
Employment" Exclusion
Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce." 13 Although several lower federal courts have construed the
clause narrowly," 4 the Supreme Court has yet to define the scope of
this exception. 115
An interpretive problem arises from Congress's use of the word
"commerce" twice in section 1.116 That section first uses the term, "as
herein defined," to delineate the reach of the remedial provisions of
the Act.1 7 Courts interpret this use of the term as consonant with the
112 Note, however, that Gilmer involved an arbitration promise in an agreement be-
tween an employee and a third party. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
113 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See supra note 38 for the full text of § 1.
114 See, e.g., Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, (U.E.) Local
437, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953) (excluding from the scope of the exception em-
ployees engaged in production of goods for subsequent sale in interstate commerce).
115 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (leaving the issue
"for another day").
116 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
117 See id. §§ 1, 3-4.
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full reach of the Congress's Article I commerce clause power."18
"Commerce" is then used in the last sentence of section 1 to specify
the scope of the exclusion clause for "contracts of employment."" 9
Ordinary principles of statutory construction would suggest that Con-
gress intended the same broad meaning for the word "commerce" in
the exclusion clause. 120
This broad reading of the exclusion clause would effectively pre-
clude mandatory arbitration of any employment dispute that would
otherwise be within the reach of the FAA.' 2' Nevertheless, federal
courts do not agree on whether to read the clause broadly or nar-
rowly, largely because of the dearth of legislative history concerning
the intended scope of the clause. 122
One federal district court observed that interpreting the exclu-
sion clause presents "[a] certain amount of confusion.' 23 This proba-
bly understates the difficulties. The exclusion clause did not appear
in the ABA committee's original draft.124 It was inserted at the insis-
tence of labor representatives who feared that the FAA would reach
118 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987) ("[T]he Federal Arbitration
Act embodies Congress' intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
within the full reach of the Commerce Clause."); cf Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
115 S. Ct. 884, 839-40 (1995) (interpreting the words "involving commerce" in § 2 of the
FAA as corresponding to Congress's full power under the commerce clause).
119 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
120 This is particularly true because "commerce" is in the first instance "herein" de-
fined; whether "herein" means "in section 1" or "in the entire Act," the term should mean
the same thing in the very same sentence in § 1. Compare Cox, supra note 39, at 601 (indicat-
ing that the argument of textual inconsistency can be advanced, but concluding that a
narrow interpretation of the clause is preferable because it is consistent with the current
congressional attitude toward judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate) with
Michael J. Gallagher, Note, Statutory Rights and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Contracts
of Employmen; 66 ST. JoHN's L. RFv. 1067, 1084-85 (1993) (concluding that the legislative
history and the Supreme Court's treatment of the exclusion clause support a broad
interpretation).
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has recently emphasized the words "involv-
ing commerce" to support a broad reading of § 2, Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 840; see
supra note 118, there is nothing in the legislative history of the FAA to suggest that Con-
gress had in mind a narrower meaning for "workers engaged in. .. commerce" in § 1. As
the Court pointed out, see Aied-Bruc Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 840, Congress used the lan-
guage of the commerce clause itself when defining "commerce" in § 1-the very section
that included the exception for "contracts of employment." Moreover, there is no valid
policyjustification for limiting the exclusion clause on the basis of workers' relative involve-
ment in commerce. See also infra note 341.
121 Cf Estreicher, supra note 17, at 762 (1990) ("It remains to be seen whether section
1 should be read as a flat exclusion of all individual employment contracts. The 'plain
meaning' of the clause suggests one answer.").
122 See id.
123 United Indus. Workers v. Virgin Islands, 792 F. Supp. 420, 425 n.12 (D.V.I. 1992)
(discussing the Third Circuit's handling of the issue of the reach of the FAA § 1 exclusion
clause), aff, 987 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1993).
124 See S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922); see supra note 46.
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labor controversies.' 25 ABA reports describing the lobbying initiative
confirm that labor opposition was the motivation for including the
amendment. 26
Although some commentators have suggested that the concerns
voiced by organized labor were limited to protecting unions' ability to
use economic weapons to achieve a stronger bargaining position, 127
the purpose of the exclusion clause was probably broader. 28 The
bill's supporters assured labor organizations that the FAA was only in-
tended to apply to disputes between business persons, and that the
exclusion clause merely clarified what was already in the bill as origi-
nally drafted.' 29 At least one ABA publication from the period ex-
plained the clause without confining it to the context of industrial
disputes.'30 Moreover, a letter from Secretary of Commerce Hoover
125 See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on theJudiciary on S.4213 and S.4214,
67th Cong., 4th Sess., at 9 (Jan. 31, 1923) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
126 Objections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth as representing
the Seamen's Union, Mr. Furuseth taking the position that seamen's wages
came within admiralty jurisdiction and should not be subject to an agree-
ment to arbitrate. In order to eliminate this opposition, the committee
consented to [the] amendment to Section I ....
1923 ABA Committee Report supra note 46, at 287.
127 Professor Estreicher maintains that union opposition was premised on potential
government intervention in the bargaining process, which might have led to mandatory
"interests" arbitration:
Since there was very little arbitration of "rights" disputes under collective
bargaining agreements at the time-something organized labor, in any
event, generally favored-abor's opposition was aimed at what it feared
might be government-imposed arbitration of "interests" disputes in deroga-
tion of its right to strike. This was consistent with the AFL's general opposi-
tion during this period to "compulsory arbitration, compulsory
investigation of industrial disputes, industrial courts, and similar devices
which involve limitations upon the right to strike and regulation of rela-
tions between employers and employees by law."
Estreicher, supra note 17, at 761 n.25 (quoting LEwis L. LORWIN, THE AMERICAN FEDERA-
TION OF LABOR: HISTORY, POLICIES, AND PROSPEcTS 401-02 (1933)). The goal of "interests"
arbitration is to establish contractual obligations when the parties cannot agree to them,
whereas "rights" arbitration refers to the resolution of disputes arising under an agreement
that already exists.
128 See generally Cox, supra note 39, at 606 (arguing that a broad interpretation of the
FAA § 1 exclusion clause tracks Congress's likely views in 1925, but that a narrow interpre-
tation is consistent with the more modern congressional understanding of arbitration in
the labor context); Gallagher, supra note 120, at 1078-85 (arguing for a broad interpreta-
tion of the FAA § 1 exclusion clause).
129 See Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 9.
130 J.P. Chamberlain, in an article describing the ABA's lobbying initiative, explained
the amendment creating the "contracts of employment" exclusion in the following way:
[In] the matter of the Amalgamated Association of Railroad Employees ....
[t] here was a contract between the company and the employees containing
an arbitration provision, but the court refused the motion [to refer to arbi-
tration] since in this case the men had struck and thus themselves broken
the contract before they made the motion. It, furthermore, held that the
contract to arbitrate did not extend to the question directly involved, but
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to a Senate subcommittee does not suggest that business interests op-
posed a broad exclusion clause.' 31
Most compelling, however, is that the most expansive explana-
tions of the exclusion clause were presented at committee hearings in
the presence of House and Senate members. Secretary Hoover's let-
ter was presented to the relevant committees and did not indicate that
the clause was aimed at workers in a particular union or those with a
particular kind of contract.132 Similarly, the chairperson of the ABA
committee that conceived the bill told Senate members that the
clause did not "refer[ ] to labor disputes at a14" but only applied to
"merchants." 33
there would seem to be no reason why under the decision an agreement to
arbitrate written into a contract between employer and employee could not
be enforced under the [New York arbitration] statute. The bill providing
for arbitration in the federal courts was amended at the instance of the
representatives of the Seamen's Union who did not want seamen's wages to
be subject to compulsory arbitration.
Chamberlain, supra note 48, at 525 (citation omitted). Chamberlain's reference to In re
Division 132 of Amalgamated Association of Street & Electric Railroad Employees, 188
N.Y.S. 353 (Sup. Ct. 1921), a case involving workers employed by a traction company, sug-
gests that the ABA (and, presumably, the bill's congressional sponsors) may have intended
the clause to reach beyond seamen and even other workers directly involved with interstate
commerce.
131 Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, in a letter to Senator Sterling, who was
the chairperson of a joint subcommittee that heard testimony on the bill, indicated that
"[i]f objection appears to the inclusion of workers' contracts in the law's scheme, it might
be well amended by stating 'but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce.'" Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciay on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 21
(1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings].
132 Hoover wrote generically about the problem of including "workers' contracts." Id.
133 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 9 (emphasis added). This elaboration of the
exclusion clause is sufficiently expansive to warrant rejection of Professor Estreicher's argu-
ment, see supra note 127, that the clause applies only to "interests" disputes. Even if "rights"
arbitration were unheard of at the time of the FAA's passage-a proposition that Es-
treicher does not defend-the ABA committee chair's testimony explained the clause as
clarifying what must have already seemed obvious to most members: that the FAA was
"purely an act to give the merchants the right [to agree to arbitrate]." Senate Hearings, supra
note 125, at 9 (emphasis added). That the clause merely stated the obvious is confirmed
by the utter lack of controversy over the amendment. Professor Estreicher's allusion to
"interests" arbitration is therefore beside the point. The portion of the Senate committee
hearings in which Mr. Piatt disclosed the amendment excluding "contracts of employ-
ment" is so compelling that it should be quoted at length. In this passage, Mr. Piatt, the
chair of the ABA committee that drafted the bill, reassured Senator Walsh that the bill was
intended to cover only merchants, not contracts involving employees, or other types of con-
tracts of adhesion, which likewise were never intended to be covered by the Act:
Mr. Piatt. .... [Mr. Furuseth of the Seamen's Union] has objected to [the
federal bill], and criticised it on the ground that the bill in its present form
would affect, in fact compel, arbitration of the matters of agreement be-
tween the stevedores and their employers. Now, it was not the intention of
this bill to have any such effect as that. It was not the intention of this bill
to make an industrial arbitration in any sense; and.., if your honorable
committee should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add to
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The drafters of the exclusion clause arguably did not intend the
exception to reach all employment contracts, having included qualify-
ing language following the words "contracts of employment."18 4 The
drafters' inclusion of the words "classes of workers" suggests that they
viewed contracts of "workers" as a subset of "employment" con-
tracts.13 5 Union opposition to the bill clarifies what type of employee
Congress meant by the word "worker." Organized labor was most
likely concerned about preserving its role with respect to employees
who were union members or who might join unions. 3 6
The federal circuits have split in their interpretations of the sec-
tion 1 proviso. They have faced two principal questions in interpret-
ing the clause: (1) whether it excludes arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements from the FAA's coverage and (2) whether it
applies to a narrower range of "interstate commerce" activities than
those otherwise reached by the Act. Litigants and amici curiae have
the bill the following language, "but nothing herein contained shall apply
to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce." It is
not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is
purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and
agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it. Now,
that is all there is in this.
Senator Walsh of Montana. The trouble... is that a great many of these
contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily [sic] things at all.
Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you
can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either you can
make that contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same with a
good many contracts of employment. A man says "There are our terms. All right,
take it or leave it." Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it;
and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has
to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
Id. (emphasis added). The exchange continued, and Mr. Piatt allayed Senator Walsh's
fears by indicating that the bill was not intended to apply to such situations:
Senator Walsh of Montana. And then [carriers] have the regular bill of
lading contract, but they have a further provision that any controversy aris-
ing under the contract shall be submitted to arbitration; and the fellow says
"Well, I haven't any confidence in it. If I have a controversy I would like to
have it tried before a court, where I feel I can getjustice."
Mr. Piatt. . . . . I would not favor any kind of legislation that would permit
the forcing [sic] a man to sign that kind of a contract.
Id. at 10.
134 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
135 Alternatively, the drafters may have meant to use "workers' "contracts as an exam-
ple of "employment" contracts. This is unlikely, however, because (1) the enumeration
following "contracts of employment" appears to be restrictive, at least according to the
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and (2) the exclusion clause already uses seamen
and railroad employees as specific examples of workers whose contracts would be ex-
cluded. Id.; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948, 951-52 (2d Cir.
1955) (holding that a plant supervisor is not a "worker" within the meaning of § 1), rev'd on
other grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). The Supreme Court specifically declined to decide
whether the supervisor was a "worker" under § 1 of the Act. 350 U.S. at 201 n.3.
136 See discussion infra part III.C.2 (arguing for a "power" test for determining whether
an employee is a "worker" for purposes of the exclusion clause).
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twice submitted briefs to the Supreme Court on the clause's scope,
but the Court has not decided the issue.'3 7 The Steelworkers Trilogy,38
which held that arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agree-
ments are enforceable under section 301 of the LMRA, diminishes the
importance of the FAA's applicability to collective bargaining agree-
ments. However, the federal courts of appeals' decisions shed light on
the applicability of the exclusion clause to individual contracts of
employment. 3 9
In International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring,14° an employer sued a union in federal court for damages
resulting from a strike allegedly violating a collective bargaining
agreement The union moved for a stay pending arbitration under
section 3 of the FAA. The district court denied the stay on the ground
that the section 1 exclusion clause made the FAA inapplicable to col-
lective bargaining agreements. 141 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the agreement was "a contract relating to the
employment of workers engaged in interstate commerce, within the
clear meaning of the exclusion clause." 142
The Colonial Hardwood Flooring court had no trouble finding that
a union contract was a "contract of employment"; instead it focused
on whether the exclusion clause applies to the entire Act or only to
the sections that explicitly refer to "commerce."143 The court ulti-
mately held that the exclusion clause applies to all sections of the FAA
and excludes employment contracts to the same extent that the Act
reaches other contracts, because Congress used the term that demar-
cates the scope of the act generally--"commerce"-in the exclusion
clause as well.'4 Other circuits had held that the stay and order provi-
137 The following organizations briefed the issue in Gilmer the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Association of Retired
Persons, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 1, 36 (1991) (Stevens,J., dissenting). The litigants in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), also briefed the issue, but the Court
decided the case without even mentioning the FAA. Id. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's "silent treatment" of the question).
138 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
139 See also Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 32 ViLT. L. REv. 57, 66-67 (1987) (arguing that the'applicability of the FAA
to collective bargaining agreements is important insofar as it affects post-arbitral judicial
review).
140 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
141 Id. at 34-35. The district court held, in the alternative, that the collective bargain-
ing agreement in question did not provide for arbitration of the dispute. Id.
142 Id. at 35. The court also affirmed the district judge's holding that the dispute was
not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
143 Id. at 37.




sions in sections 3 and 4 are not limited by sections 1 and 2.145 This
section-by-section reading of the FAA gave courts significant authority
to enforce arbitration clauses by avoiding explicit limitations when de-
ciding cases under sections 3 or 4.146
Although section-by-section analysis of the FAA enjoyed early sup-
port in some circuits' 47 and even in one Supreme Court decision, 148 it
was based on a pre-Etie view of federal procedure' 49 and a narrow un-
derstanding of the commerce clause power.'50 The Supreme Court
repudiated this section-by-section analysis in Bernhardt, holding that a
section 3 stay was unavailable because the parties' agreement to arbi-
trate did not appear in a contract involving "commerce." 15 Thus, the
Court held, the section 3 stay provision should be read with sections 1
and 2 as "integral parts of a whole."' 52 The Court also indicated that
the FAA was enacted under the commerce clause.' 53 This prevented
the lower courts from viewing the section 3 stay provision as a proce-
dural mechanism enacted under Congress's Article III powers and ap-
plicable to all actions in federal court; rather, it required the lower
The office of an exception in a statute is well understood. It is intended to
except something from the operative effect of a statute or to qualify or re-
strain the generality of the substantive enactment to which it is attached
and it is not necessarily limited to the section of the statute immediately
following or preceding. The scope of the exception or proviso in the stat-
ute must be gathered from the view of the whole law, and if the language of
the exception is in perfect harmony with the general scope of the entire
statute, the exclusion is applicable to the whole act. It is clear that the
exception here in question was deliberately worded by the Congress to ex-
clude from the [FAA] all contracts of employment of workers engaged in
interstate commerce.
Id. at 37-38.
145 See, e.g., Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
146 For example, in 1945 the Third Circuit held that a collective bargaining agreement
requiring arbitration was subject to § 3 of the FAA, which authorizes a stay pending arbitra-
tion, even though it was excluded by the § 1 "contracts of employment" clause. Watkins v.
Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied; 327 U.S. 777 (1946).
147 E.g., Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944). Agos-
tini held that a contractor's motion to stay proceedings in a breach-of-contract action by a
subcontractor should have been granted under § 3, even though the transaction did not
involve "commerce" for purposes of § 1 or § 2. Id. at 855-56.
148 See Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 452-
53 (1935) (holding that a district court's authority to grant a stay pending arbitration,
under FAA § 3, was not conditioned upon its power to compel arbitration under § 4 of the
FAA).
149 For example, Shanferoke allowed a stay in a diversity action in the Southern District
of New York in a situation in which a New York state court would have denied the stay. 293
U.S. at 452-53.
150 See, e.g., Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 1945) ("We do not
think that the limitation in the definition [of commerce] in section 1 should be applied as
an over-all limitation elsewhere to the section where the defined term is not used.").
151 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956).
152 Id. at 201.
153 350 U.S. at 201-02 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
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courts to apply section 3 only to contracts otherwise falling within the
FAA.1 5 4
In Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers,'55 the Third Circuit avoided the contortions of section-by-sec-
tion analysis by narrowing the scope of the exclusion clause. As in
Colonial Hardwood Flooring, a union was defending a LMRA section 301
suit for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.156 The Third
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a stay, holding that sec-
tion 3 of the FAA applied to the arbitration clause in the agree-
ment.15 7 Because the court conceded that a collective bargaining
agreement was a "contract of employment," 58 it needed to avoid the
section 1 exclusion clause.' 5 9 The court resolved the problem by
holding that the exclusion clause applies to a narrower set of contracts
than the FAA otherwise reaches. 160 The court reasoned that since the
clause mentions seamen and railroad workers, the exclusion can only
apply to workers who are "actually engaged in the movement of inter-
state or foreign commerce."'161
154 The Fourth Circuit's Agostini Bros. decision exemplifies the older view, which holds
that the commerce clause power is not broad enough to support a general rule requiring
arbitration, and that § 3 of the FAA is a general procedural rule applicable in federal
courts:
[T]he second section [of the FAA] proceeds to lay down a rule of substan-
tive law regarding the validity of an agreement for arbitration in case of any
maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce. Congress was here making a rule concerning subject matter within
its own constitutional legislative authority. It was not seeking to confer va-
lidity to arbitration agreements generally, a matter outside the scope of fed-
eral powers.
Then in § 3 the statute deals with the conduct of suits in federal courts,
again a subject matter of congressional power. The language becomes gen-
eral: "any suit or proceeding," upon "any issue referable to arbitration
under an agreement in writing for such arbitration" are the words. Con-
gress is not limited, in legislating as to law suits in federal courts, to those
suits involving matters where the substantive rights of the parties may be
controlled by federal legislation.... We think it clear that the provisions of
§ 3 are not to be limited to the specific instances dealt with in § 2.
Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944) (quoting
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943)).
155 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
156 Id. at 451.
157 Id. at 453-54.
158 Id. at 451-52 (citing Gadiff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944); Interna-
tional Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33
(4th Cir. 1948); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d
Cir. 1951); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1952)).
159 The court phrased the issue as "whether the plaintiff's employees, who are engaged
in the manufacture of goods for commerce and plant maintenance incidental thereto, are
to be regarded as a 'class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' within the
meaning of the exclusionary clause." Tenney Engineering, 207 F.2d at 452.
160 Id. at 452-53.
161 Id.
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Thus, the Tenney Engineering court looked to the FAA for a sub-
stantive federal rule supporting the enforcement of an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 162 Lincoln Mills and the
Steelworkers cases would soon announce broad federal authority to en-
force labor contract arbitration clauses based on section 301 itself.163
Tenney Engineerings narrow reading of the exclusion clause served the
same goal of enforcing these arbitration clauses, but it rested on two
questionable rationales: (1) the legislative history of the FAA and (2)
Congress's understanding of the commerce clause when it enacted
the FAA. 164
The legislative history does not persuasively support the Third
Circuit's view. Tenney Engineering erroneously suggested that a particu-
lar ABA committee report contained "[t] he only reference to the
clause in question."165 That report indicated that a lobbyist for the
Seamen's Union had opposed the bill as originally drafted by the ABA
and that the ABA subsequently amended the draft by adding the "con-
tracts of employment" proviso. 166 The court also noted that federal
law had already mandated an adjustment procedure for disputes in-
volving seamen and railroad workers167 and that both groups were
"engaged directly in ... the movement of interstate or foreign com-
merce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect
part of it."168 Since Congress specifically mentioned these workers in
the exclusion clause, the court found an intent to limit the clause to
those who work directly in interstate transportation. 169
Tenney Engineering rests on a dubious version of the FAA's history.
The ABA report itself does not explain the reasons for the Seamen's
Union's opposition to the ABA bill.170 Furthermore, the opinion ig-
nores subsequent legislative history suggesting that the amendment
was not directed solely at contracts of seamen and railroad workers. 171
162 The jurisdictional basis of the employer's claim for damage was § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Id. at 451.
163 See supra notes 16, 21-23 and accompanying text.
164 Tenney Engineering, 207 F.2d at 452-53.
165 Id. at 452 (citing 1923 ABA Committee Repor4 supra note 46).
166 1923 ABA Committee Report, supra note 46, at 287 (1923) ("Objections to the bill
were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth as representing the Seamen's Union, Mr. Furuseth
taking the position that seamen's wages came within admiralty jurisdiction and should not
be subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In order to eliminate this opposition, the commit-
tee consented to [the 'contracts of employment'] amendment...
167 Tenney Engineering, 207 F.2d at 452.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 452-53 ("The draftsmen had in mind the two groups of transportation work-
ers as to which special arbitration legislation already existed and they rounded out the
exclusionary clause by excluding all other similar classes of workers.").
170 The report only indicates that the Seamen's lobbyist did not want the bill to apply
to wage disputes involving seamen, but says nothing about existing dispute resolution pro-
cedures. See 1923 ABA Committee Report, supra note 46, at 287.
171 See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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For example, the chairperson of the ABA committee that produced
the initial draft of the bill testified before a congressional committee
that "[iut is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor
disputes at all."172 This indicates that legislators probably understood
that the bill was opposed by organized labor in general, or at least that
the proper response to opposition by one union was to exempt all
workers' contracts. In addition, the legislative record indicates that
the primary motivation for the bill was to ensure the arbitrability of
contracts between merchants. 173 Because the exclusion clause
amendment was presented to Congress against this backdrop, there is
every reason to believe Congress intended the clause to sweep
broadly.
Second, the Tenney Engineering court based its narrow reading of
the exclusion clause on Congress's much narrower understanding of
the commerce clause in 1925.174 Although the court's premise that
"[c]ongressional power over... interstate commerce had not devel-
oped to the extent to which it was expanded in the succeeding years"
is correct, it does not support a narrower interpretation of "com-
merce" in the exclusion clause than in the definition of the scope of
the Act. Assuming a narrow understanding of the commerce clause,
Tenney Engineering should also have held that the FAA itself only
reaches contracts linked directly to interstate or foreign commerce.
But the court faced a dilemma: If the FAA provided no basis for re-
quiring arbitration, then the courts would have been powerless to ef-
fectuate the Taft-Hartley Act's mandate to enforce collective
bargaining agreements. 7 5
An alternate approach to the bifurcated interpretation of "com-
merce" is to base the courts' authority to enforce collective bargaining
agreements on the Taft-Hartley Act itself, as recognized by other fed-
eral courts of appeals reviewing section 301 decisions before the Steel-
workers Trilogy. 76 The bifurcated view, however, has survived in post-
172 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 9 (quoting W.H.H. Piatt of the American Bar
Association).
173 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (quoting Senate Hearings, supra note 125,
at 9 (The FAA is "purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting
down and agreeing with each other.")).
174 Tenney Engineering, 207 F.2d at 453.
175 This dilemma was resolved by Lincoln Mills and its Steelworkers progeny. See supra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Shirley-Herman Co. v. International HOD Carriers, Bldg. & Common La-
borers Union, Local Union No. 210, 182 F.2d 806, 809-810 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that
the FAA's exclusion of employment contracts, including union contracts, does not prevent
the enforcement of an arbitration clause to effectuate the purposes of the Taft-Hartley
Act); International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.,
168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). This rationale presaged the "body of federal substantive law"
that would soon materialize in Lincoln Mills.
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Trilogy decisions, limiting the exclusion clause in section 1 of the FAA
to a small subset of employment contracts.
Subsequent cases limiting the scope of the exclusion clause to
workers directly involved in interstate transportation rely heavily on
Tenney Engineering, importing its questionable analysis into the context
of individual employment contracts. For example, when basketball
greatJulius "DoctorJ" Erving signed a contract to play for the Atlanta
Hawks, he sued to set aside his contract with the Virginia Squires on
grounds of fraud. 177 The Squires contract contained an arbitration
clause.178 Following Tenney Engineering, the Second Circuit held that
the contract was not within the scope of the FAA exclusion clause, and
that Erving was therefore required to arbitrate. 79
Similarly, the First Circuit in Dickstein v. duPont'80 relied on Ten-
ney Engineering to condition an employee's exemption from the FAA
on being "involved in, or closely related to, the actual movement of
goods in interstate commerce."' 81 The court in Dickstein required a
stockbroker to arbitrate a contract claim against duPont, his former
employer, because his application to the New York Stock Exchange
contained an agreement to arbitrate disputes concerning his employ-
ment.18 2 In Hydrick v. Management Recruiters International, Inc.,'83 a fed-
eral district court applied the same test to justify a stay of a lawsuit by
an employee of a personnel recruitment company.
Although Tenney Engineering is the majority position, 84 its con-
struction of the exclusion clause is not universally accepted. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Tenney Engineering position in
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc.18 5
In that case, an employer sued a union under section 301 for violating
a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 8 6 The Fourth
Circuit rejected a narrow reading of the exclusion clause and affirmed
177 See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir. 1972).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1067.
180 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971).
181 Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 785.
182 Id. at 784-85.
183 738 F. Supp. 1434 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
184 See, e.g., Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir.
1972); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand,
778 F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Since Tenney, other courts have adopted a similar
construction of the [§ 1] exemption.") (citing Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859
F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988)); Management Recruiters Int'l v. Nebel, 765 F. Supp. 419,
421-22 (N.D. Ohio 1991); see also Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117,
123 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (former CEO's claim under employment agreement not covered by
the FAA).
185 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
186 Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d at 222.
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the district court's denial of a stay because the FAA did not apply to
the collective bargaining agreement in question.' 8 7
The Third Circuit (which decided Tenney Engineering) has since
suggested in dicta that developments in labor arbitration cast doubt
on Tenney Engineering.188 In Service Employees International Union, Local
No. 36 v. Office Center Services, Inc., Judge Rosenn insightfully explained
that Lincoln Mills and its progeny have made the FAA much less rele-
vant to labor arbitration.'8 9 Without explicitly repudiating Tenney En-
gineering, Judge Rosenn cited several cases suggesting that "[i]n part
because of this infrequent use, there is a serious question as to
whether the applicability of the [FAA] to labor arbitration agreements
retains any vitality in this circuit "190 In other dicta, the Third Circuit
has implied that the FAA's exclusion clause may in fact exclude all
collective bargaining agreements, Tenney Engineering notwith-
standing. 191
187 Id. at 223-24 (affirming district court's denial of a stay). The court correctly indi-
cated that nothing in the legislative history shows that Congress intended a narrower scope
for the exclusion clause than for the reach of the FAA's substantive provisions, both of
which are framed in "commerce" terms:
Nor are we impressed by the argument that the excepting clause of the
statute should be construed as not applying to employees engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce as distinguished from workers
engaged in transportation in interstate commerce, as held by the majority
in Tenney Engineering Co. v. United Electrical Radio & Mach. Workers
.... Congress in enacting the arbitration act was endeavoring to exercise
the full extent of its power with relation to the subject matter. There is no
reason to think that it was not intended that the exception incorporated in
the statute should not reach also to the full extent of its power. As said by
Professor Cox: "One should not rely on one policy in interpreting the
phrases relating to commerce and an opposite conception in reading 'con-
tract of employment.'"
Id. at 224 (citation omitted). But cf. supra note 120; infra note 341 (noting the potential
complication arising from Congress's use of the words "involving commerce" in § 2 of the
FAA but not in § 1).
188 See Service Employees Int'l Union v. Office Ctr. Servs., 670 F.2d 404, 406 n.6 (3d
Cir. 1982).
189 Id. at 407 n.6 ("Since the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court announcing
broad principles of arbitral primacy and judicial deference to labor arbitration ... parties
to labor arbitration agreements have been able to enforce the terms of those agreements
directly under § 301 without reference to the Federal Arbitration Act."). But cf. supra note
13 (indicating that the FAA is a persuasive source for filling gaps in § 301 cases).
190 Service Employees, 670 F.2d at 407 n.6.
191 See Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127 & n.18 (3d Cir. 1969)
("We have previously held that the [FAA] is inapplicable to appeals from labor arbitration
awards due to the exclusion of 'contracts of employment.' "). Indeed, the Ludwig Honold
Mfg. dictum cites a pre-Tenney case excluding union contracts under the § 1 proviso. Id.
(citing Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951)).
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B. Gilmer Arbitrability of Federal Statutory Employment Claims
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.192 is the latest Supreme
Court decision interpreting the FAA in the employment context.
Robert Gilmer'sjob as a stock broker required him to register with the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 193 The registration application re-
quired arbitration of "[a] ny controversy between a registered repre-
sentative and any member or member organization arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered repre-
sentative."194 Gilmer's firm discharged him, and he sued his former
employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
in federal court.' 95 The Supreme Court held that the FAA required
arbitration "unless Congress itself ha[d] evinced an intention [in the
ADEA] to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue." 196 Since Congress had evinced no such intention
when it enacted the ADEA, the FAA required arbitration of the
claim. 19 7
Justice White, writing for the Court, placed the "burden... on
Gilmer to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of ajudi-
cial forum for ADEA claims."198 The Court's analysis of congressional
intent took policy considerations into account. For example, the
Court indicated that there was no "inherent inconsistency between
[the social policies of the ADEA] and enforcing agreements to arbi-
trate age discrimination claims"' 99 and that the applicable NYSE arbi-
tration rules contained safeguards sufficient to prevent bias.200
192 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
193 Id. at 23.
194 Id. (quoting appendix to brief for respondent).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985)). Mitsubishi involved antitrust claims by an automobile distributor against
a manufacturer where the parties had agreed to arbitrate disputes before an international
tribunal. 473 U.S. at 617. The Supreme Court held that the FAA required arbitration of
the federal statutory antitrust claims. Id. at 628. The Court clarified that the FAA issue
involved a two-step inquiry, which asks (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dis-
pute and (2) whether, notwithstanding the agreement to arbitrate, external legal con-
straints foreclosed arbitration of the matter. Id. The Court emphasized that the "federal
substantive law of arbitrability" informs the first stage of the inquiry. Id. at 626.
197 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-29.
198 Id. at 26.
199 Id. at 27.
200 Id. at 30. The Gilmer Court also indicated that the less pervasive discovery in arbi-
tration does not warrant a rejection of the alternative forum, that the NYSE rules require
arbitrators to issue written opinions, that the inability of grievants in arbitration to bring
class actions is mitigated by the ADEA's provision for actions by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and that the potential for unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees "is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements
are never enforceable in the employment context." Id. at 31-33.
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Gilmer explicitly avoided addressing the scope of the section 1 ex-
clusion clause by holding that a securities registration application is
not a "contract of employment" but a contract with a third party.201
This conclusion rests on a questionable reading of both the FAA and
the facts of Gilmer. First, the FAA does not contemplate the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements between a litigant and a third party.
Sections 3 and 4, which authorize courts to order arbitration when an
agreement provides for it,202 suggest that Congress intended this
power to apply only to disputes between actual parties to an agree-
ment to arbitrate.203 Second, the Court's assertion that the arbitra-
tion promise was not part of Gilmer's employment contract is
unpersuasive, given that "Gilmer was... required as a condition of his
employment to become a registered representative of several stock ex-
changes, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). "204 If Gil-
mer's employment contract required him to register with the NYSE,
then that contract implicitly required arbitration.
201 Id. at 25 n.2 ("[I]twould be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion
because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of em-
ployment .... Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration
application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate.").
202 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994); see also supra note 39 (complete text).
203 Section 3 provides for a stay pending arbitration, when the lawsuit is "brought...
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration
... on application of one of the parties." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). Although this language does
not clearly limit such stays to situations in which the applicant is a party to the agreement
to arbitrate, other parts of the FAA indicate such a limitation. For example, the proviso at
the end of § 3 that "the applicant [may not be] ... in default in proceeding with such
arbitration" strongly suggests that Congress did not contemplate stays premised on arbitra-
tion promises made to third parties not involved in the action. Id. In addition, the lan-
guage of § 4, which authorizes arbitration orders following petitions to federal district
courts, apparently applies only when the arbitration agreement is between the litigants.
That section allows "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure ... to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration" to petition for an order compelling arbitration. 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1994); see also supra note 39 (complete text). The court may then "make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement." Id. Thus, the words "party" and "parties" denote the parties to the alleged
arbitration agreement. This language, therefore, in theory should not apply when a party
seeking arbitration is not involved in the alleged agreement to arbitrate. In practice, of
course, the courts have allowed third-party beneficiaries to invoke the FAA. See, e.g., Kid-
der, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership, 41 F.3d 861, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1994).
204 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went on to address
the issue of the § 1 proviso, concluding as follows:
When the FAA was passed in 1925, 1 doubt that any legislator who voted for
it expected it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts between parties
of unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising out of
the employment relationship. In recent years, however, the Court "has ef-
fectively rewritten the statute," and abandoned its earlier view that statutory
claims were not appropriate subjects for mandatory arbitration.
Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted).
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The Gilmer court also considered the applicability of Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 20 5 a 1974 case in which the Court held that a com-
pleted arbitration of a discrimination claim under a collective bargain-
ing agreement did not preclude a subsequent federal lawsuit under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 20 6 Commentators understood
Gardner-Denver and its progeny20 7 to establish a general rule that an
employee could litigate a statutory claim regardless of a contractual
promise to arbitrate.208 Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver on three
grounds: (1) Gilmer involved the arbitration of a statutory claim
rather than a claim predicated on a collective bargaining agreement;
(2) the union context in Gardner-Denver brought into play a tension
between unions' collective interests and individual claimants' rights;
and (3) Gardner-Denver was decided without reference to the FAA.2 0 9
As Gilmer and Gardner-Denver illustrate, an employee's member-
ship in a union significantly influences the arbitrability determination.
Indeed, these cases emanate from two distinct lines of authority, one
dealing with the union context, the other with individual employment
contracts. The Gilmer majority's attempt to justify the application of
different rules on policy grounds, 210 however, suggests that the
Supreme Court does not view the doctrines of labor and individual
contract arbitration as completely separate. Rather, the Court at-
tempted to harmonize the two lines of authority by emphasizing the
vulnerability of union members who assert individual employment
rights.
Gilmer involved a federal age discrimination claim and arguably
established a clear rule governing the arbitrability of federal statutory
employment claims.21' However, many employment law cases involve
205 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Gardner-Denver Court also took policy considerations into
account in determining that a Title VII claim was not barred by prior arbitration of a claim
under a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 59-60 ("[T]he federal policy favoring arbi-
tration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment prac-
tices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his
remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and
his cause of action under Title VII.").
206 Id. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
207 See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
208 See Magyar, supra note 4, at 647-48.
209 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-34.
210 Id.
211 But cf. Cunningham, supra note 31, at 59 (noting that employers are concerned
about the costs of litigating state employment claims and addressing issues regarding the
finality of arbitration proceedings); Martha S. Weisel, Effectiveness of Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts, ARB.J.,June 1992, at 19, 25 ("[E]mployers are well advised to proceed
with caution .... The U.S. Supreme Court did not give a clear signal in Gilmer. The
[C] ourt's decision concerning the arbitrability of federal employment claims appears to be
a yellow light. .. ").
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only state claims or a combination of state and federal claims.212 Gil-
mer does not establish a clear arbitrability standard for state claims.
Courts deciding motions to compel arbitration of state employment
claims consequently have developed a variety of standards purportedly
grounded in Gilmer.
Lower federal courts have interpreted Gilmer as imposing a heavy
burden on litigants seeking to avoid arbitration of federal statutory
claims against employers. For example, federal courts of appeals have
required arbitration of Title VII claims for race and gender discrimi-
nation213 and of Employee Polygraph Protection Act claims.214 The
overwhelming trend is to require arbitration in such cases. Part III
analyzes the related issue of arbitrability when an employee asserts a
state-law claim instead of (or in addition to) a federal statutory claim.
III
EMPLOYEE CLAIMS UNDER STATE LAW: THE I-JMITS
OF GILME R
The cases involving the arbitrability of state-law claims by employ-
ees appear to follow the pro-arbitration trend of the cases involving
federal claims. Courts have applied at least four analytically distinct
standards for determining the arbitrability of state claims, all of which
purportedly follow from Gilmer (1) the parallel federal claim stan-
dard; (2) preemption analysis; (3) state legislative intent analysis; and
(4) interest analysis. This Part describes these arbitrability standards
and highlights their drawbacks. Given the current pro-arbitration
mood, the "interest analysis" approach, which may be the most defen-
sible, is probably the least likely to prevail.
Recognizing that the standards will generally force employees to
arbitrate disputes with their employers, this Part considers the stan-
dards' doctrinal implications. These standards may yield inconsistent
treatment of union and nonunion employees, a result that the deci-
sions do not attempt to justify. Another anomaly is the courts' unwill-
ingness to recognize the states' interest in regulating the employment
relationship-an interest the Supreme Court has emphasized in simi-
lar litigation involving union members. Finally, this Note argues that
the FAA itself contains limits to the arbitrability of employee claims.
212 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
213 See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992);
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1991); Bender v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1992).
214 See Saari v. Smith Bamey, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992). The
Employee Polygraph Protection Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
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A. Post-Gilmer Arbitrability of State-Law Claims
When litigants seek to arbitrate employment claims based on
state statutes or common-law theories, courts must decide how broadly
to interpret Gilmer, which requires arbitration of a federal statutory
claim unless Congress has manifested an intention to preclude the
parties from agreeing to do so. This inquiry is hampered by the lack
of direct evidence of congressional intent regarding cases involving
state legislative action. Congress may or may not have "intended" to
preclude arbitration of state employment claims, and evidence of such
intent may or may not lie in analogous federal legislation authorizing
causes of action against employers. Therefore, when deciding cases
involving state employment claims, courts have used standards that
differ slightly from the Gilmer formulation.
1. Four Approaches to the Problem
State and federal courts have developed a variety of standards to
determine the arbitrability of state claims. One standard analyzes
state statutes in terms of the congressional intent for a "parallel" fed-
eral statute. Similarly, when federal and state claims are joined in the
same action, some courts base the arbitrability determination entirely
on Congress's intent regarding the federal claims. A second standard
truncates the intent inquiry by asserting the primacy of the FAA over
state law and concluding that the FAA renders employees' claims arbi-
trable. A third standard performs a Gilmer-type analysis, using the
state legislature's intent as the point of reference. A fourth standard
analyzes congressional intent in terms of the interests at stake.
a. The Parallel Federal Claim Test
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Fletcher v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co.2 1-5 illustrates courts' application of the parallel federal
claim standard. The plaintiff, a registered stock broker employed as a
trade analyst,2 16 alleged that his employer, the defendant, construc-
tively discharged him after denying him compensation to which he
was entitled under his employment contract.2 17 Fletcher brought a
race discrimination action under the New York Human Rights Act.218
215 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993).
216 Id. at 1006 (Smith, J., dissenting).
217 Id. The complaint alleged that the "defendant concluded that 'the amount it was
obligated to pay Mr. Fletcher was simply too much money to pay a young black man.' " Id.
Fletcher also relied on "a conversation he allegedly had with defendant's head of human
resources/equal employment opportunity officer wherein plaintiff was advised that he
should not complain because he was 'one of the highest paid black males' in the country."
Id.
218 Id. at 1000; N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 (McKinney 1993) provides that:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
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Because Fletcher had signed an agreement with the New York Stock
Exchange requiring arbitration of all disputes with his employer, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have
granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration under the
FAA.21 9
The New York Court of Appeals analyzed the arbitrability of state
claims as a Gilmer question.220 Without detailed justification, the court
articulated the parallel federal claim standard: "Where the right is
predicated on a State or local statute rather than on a congressional
enactment, it is undisputed by these parties that the courts are obliged
to draw an analogy to the equivalent Federal law, where possible, and
to consider Congress' intentions with regard to the rights created by
that law."22 ' The claims were subject to mandatory arbitration be-
cause Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not indicate a congres-
sional intention to preclude an arbitral forum for race discrimination
claims.222
Fetcherillustrates the potential tension between state employment
laws and the federal policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving
contract disputes. Although the New York antidiscrimination statute
explicitly provides for judicial review, 223 mandatory arbitration per-
mits review of an arbitrator's decision only under extremely limited
circumstances. 224
(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed,
color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any individual,
to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment
such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensa-
tion or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
219 Fetcher, 619 N.E.2d at 1003 ("[W]e... hold that these cases are governed by the
presumption of arbitrability that is established by the FAA.").
220 Id. at 1001-02.
221 Id. at 1002. The parties stipulated that this approach was appropriate; the issue was
therefore not litigated. Id.
222 Id. at 1002-03. The New York Court of Appeals relied on federal court of appeals
cases, which have reached the same result where the employee asserts a federal Title VII
claim, by analogy to Gilmer. Id.
223 See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 298 (McKinney 1993).
224 Judge Posner stated the general principle in Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192
(7th Cir. 1987), in the context of contract interpretation:
As we have said too many times to want to repeat again, the question for
decision by a federal court asked to set aside an arbitration award-whether
the award is made under the Railway Labor Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, or the
United States Arbitration Act,-is not whether the arbitrator or arbitrators
erred in interpreting the contract; it is not whether they clearly erred in
interpreting the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in interpret-
ing the contract; it is whether they interpreted the contract. If they did,
their interpretation is conclusive. By making a contract with an arbitration
clause the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrators' interpretation of
the contract. A party can complain if the arbitrators don't interpret the
contract-that is, if they disregard the contract and implement their own
notions of what is reasonable or fair. A party can complain if the arbitra-
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Several courts have applied the parallel federal claim test. Spell-
man v. Securities, Annuities & Insurance Services, Inc.2 25 involved a stock-
broker's race discrimination claim under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act and related contract and tort theories.
Citing Gilmer, the California Court of Appeals upheld mandatory arbi-
tration under the FAA.22 6 The opinion emphasized the similarities
between claims under the ADEA and claims under Title VII, which are
analogous to claims under the California antidiscrimination statute.22 7
After concluding that federal law requires arbitration of Title VII
claims, the Spellman court asserted that "[ r] eliance on a state statutory
anti-discrimination scheme, as here, rather than on a federal title VII
claim, does not alter the analysis." 228 The opinion did not justify its
use of the parallel federal claim standard, except insofar as it read
Gilmer and subsequent federal cases22 9 as "stand[ing] for the proposi-
tors' decision is infected by fraud or other corruption, or if it orders an
illegal act. ...But once the court is satisfied that [the arbitrators] were
interpreting the contract, judicial review is at an end ....
Id. at 1194-95 (citations omitted); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) ("[T]he courts play only a limited role when asked to review the
decision of an arbitrator [in the collective bargaining agreement context]."). See generally
Speidel, supra note 4, at 191-98 (discussing grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards
under the FAA).
Limited judicial review was firmly established in one of the famous Steelworkers Trilogy
cases, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)
("The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts
had the final say on the merits of the awards."). One commentator has stated the underly-
ing rationale as follows:
Much of the benefit of labor arbitration ... appears to be premised on the
finality of the arbitrator's ruling. The informality of the arbitration process,
and its relative speed and low cost, would not be of much help if the arbitra-
tion proceeding [were] routinely followed by an additional procedural step
from which a final and binding ruling on the contract dispute emerged ....
[A] rbitration would amount to a largely superfluous additional step ....
Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies and Sanctions, 10
HorTsRAs LaB. LJ. 245, 248 (1992). This reasoning applies regardless of the particular
federal (or state) statute that prompted the arbitration.
225 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct. App.), modified, 8 Cal. App. 4th 452 (1992), review denied,
1992 Cal. LEXIS 5123 (Oct. 16, 1992).
226 Id. at 433.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 433-34. The Spellman court cited two cases to support this position: Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987), and Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Securities, Inc.,
781 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (E.D. Cal. 1991). Perry does not clearly support the test-there,
the U.S. Supreme Court simply indicated that there are to be no state-law limitations in
addition to the FAA § 2 provisos that arbitration is required unless "the agreement to arbi-
trate is not part of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable 'upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,'" Perry, 482 U.S. at
489-90, and that the FAA "embodies Congress' intent to provide for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause," id. at 490 (quoting
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
229 Specifically, the Spellman court cited Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d
229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991), which required arbitration of a Title VII claim after the U.S.
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tion that important social policies and public rights embodied in stat-
utes prohibiting discrimination in employment can be appropriately
resolved by arbitration."230
Courts applying the parallel federal claim test have tended to
conflate the relevant federal and state claims and to ignore any differ-
ences in the legal source of the plaintiffs cause of action when per-
forming the Gilmer analysis. In Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Securities,
Inc.,231 for example, a federal court in a diversity action decided the
arbitrability of several state statutory and common-law claims, includ-
ing a California Fair Employment and Housing Act gender discrimina-
tion claim.2 32 The court held that Gilmer required arbitration of the
state statutory claim, on the ground that "Title VII sex discrimination
claims are to be treated the same as age discrimination claims." 233
Thus, the court in Sacks equated Title VII claims with discrimination
claims in general, including those based on state law.23 Other courts
have similarly applied the parallel federal claim test without
explanation.23 5
When a plaintiff asserts federal and state claims on the same set
of facts, some courts have decided the arbitrability of the case as a
whole without analyzing the state claims separately. This approach
has been most common among federal courts in the wake of Gilmer,
despite the fact that Gilmer dealt only with a federal ADEA claim.23 6
For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.23 7 overruled a federal district court's denial of a motion
to compel arbitration of sex discrimination claims "under Title VII
and Kentucky civil rights provisions."23 8 Addressing the applicability
of Gilmer to federal gender discrimination claims, the court found
"Gilmer to be dispositive of every argument presented ... in th[e]
appeal" without separately considering the arbitrability of the related
state claim. 23 9
Similarly, in Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,240 a stock-
broker sued his former employer alleging violations of the federal Em-
Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of the Gilmer decision. Spellman, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
230 Spellman, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
231 781 F. Supp. 1475 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
232 Id. at 1476.
233 Id. at 1483.
234 Id.
235 See, e.g., Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303,306 (E.D. Mo. 1993) ("The Court also
finds that Plaintiff's claims under the [Missouri Human Rights Act], a parallel state statu-
tory right to Title VII, are subject to arbitration under the FAA.").
236 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
237 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
238 Id. at 306.
239 Id. at 307.
240 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ployee Polygraph Protection Act 241 (EPPA) and related state statutory
and tort claims. The court reasoned that Gilmer controlled because
Congress's intent regarding the arbitration of EPPA claims was no dif-
ferent from its intent regarding the ADEA claims addressed in Gil-
mer.242 Thus, the court required arbitration of the entire case on the
sole basis that the federal claim was arbitrable.
b. Preemption Analysis
The second standard applied by courts in determining the arbi-
trability of state employment claims relies on the Supremacy Clause:
the FAA preempts conflicting state law governing arbitrability. This
standard presumes that Congress did not intend to exempt any state
claims from mandatory arbitration. Courts applying this standard
have invoked Southland Corp. v. Keating243 as standing for the proposi-
tion that the FAA forecloses any state-law rationale for denying
arbitration.
For example, in Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,2 44 a securities
broker had executed a securities registration application requiring
him to arbitrate disputes according to the rules of the securities ex-
changes.245 After being discharged, he sued his former employer in a
Kansas state court for retaliatory discharge.246 The plaintiff argued on
appeal that the lower court properly denied the employer's motion to
compel arbitration because section 5-401 of the Kansas Statutes pre-
cluded arbitration of disputes between an employer and his or her
employees.247 The Kansas Supreme Court, citing Southland Corp. v.
241 Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
242 S=4 968 F.2d at 883-84.
243 465 U.S. 1 (1984). For discussion of Southland, see supra notes 88-95 and accompa-
nying text.
244 829 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1992).
245 Id. at 875-76. Skewes, like other securities brokers, was required to execute a "U-4"
(Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration Form), which provided: "I agree
to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a
customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitu-
tions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I register." Id. at 875. Skewes had regis-
tered with the NASD; the NASD Code provides an arbitration procedure applicable to "any
dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any mem-
ber of the Association, with the exception of disputes involving the insurance business of
any member which is also an insurance company: (1) between or among members; [and]
(2) between or among members and public customers, or others." Id. at 876.
246 Id.
247 That section provides:
(a) A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration is
valid ....
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a provision in a written contract
to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the par-
ties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
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Keatin 848 and Pery v. Thomas,249 held that the FAA preempted the
state statute and required arbitration of the dispute.250 Accordingly,
the Skewes court held that " [t]he FAA requires state courts to enforce
an arbitration clause despite contrary state policy."251
In Boogher v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,252 a Missouri court applied the
preemption standard to facts similar to the Fletcher case. 255 Like Al-
phonse Fletcher, stockbroker Leland Boogher's application to the
NYSE contained a promise to arbitrate.254 Following his discharge,
Boogher filed an age discrimination suit, alleging that his employer
had violated the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).255 The trial
court dismissed his complaint on the basis of the agreement to arbi-
trate. 256 On appeal, Boogher contended that the state discrimination
claim was not arbitrable because the ADEA, which provides a federal
remedy for age discrimination, does not allow for arbitration. 257
Although it noted in passing that Gilmer, decided after Boogher filed
his brief, rejected such an analysis of the ADEA, the Missouri Court of
Appeals disposed of Boogher's lawsuit on Supremacy Clause
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) shall not apply to: (1) Contracts of
insurance; (2) contracts between an employer and employees, or their re-
spective representatives; or (3) any provision of a contract providing for
arbitration of a claim in tort.
Id
248 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
249 482 U.S. 483 (1987). Pery, in which a broker sued his employer for commissions
under a state statute allowing such an action notwithstanding an arbitration agreement,
held that the FAA preempted the state statute. 482 U.S. at 491. Pery relied heavily on
Southland and Moses H. Cone and described the FAA as "a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural policies to the contrary," id. at 489 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)), and as "intend[ing] to foreclose
state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements," id.
(quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)).
250 Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 829 P.2d 874, 879 (Kan. 1992).
251 Id. at 879.
252 825 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
253 See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
254 Boogher, 825 S.W.2d at 28.
255 Id. Missouri law provides that
[i] t shall be an unlawful employment practice:
(1) For an employer, because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
ancestry, age or handicap of any individual:
(a) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or handicap.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.055 (Supp. 1994). The statute requires complainants to file first with
the State Commission on Human Rights; orders can be appealed to the state courts. Id.
§ 213.120.
256 Boogher, 825 S.W.2d at 29.
257 Id.
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grounds.258 The Missouri court admonished that "[p]laintiff's argu-
ment is flawed because the Missouri Legislature could not enact a pro-
vision of the MHRA which precludes arbitration without violating the
[S]upremacy [C]lause. Under the FAA, plaintiff's age discrimination
suit brought under the MHRA is subject to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to his agreement."25 9
Although Gilmer posits an exception to compulsory arbitration of
federal claims based on congressional intent to preclude arbitration
of particular claims,260 the Skewes and Boogher preemption test allows
for no such exception when the employee asserts a claim under state
law. The approach embodies a simple syllogism, which one New York
court has explained as follows:
Congress adopted the FAA to insure that courts would rigorously
enforce private agreements to arbitrate and it establishes an em-
phatic national policy favoring arbitration which is binding on all
courts, state and federal. Thus, if a civil complaint presenting only
state statutory violations comes within the scope of a broad arbitra-
tion agreement, the court must enforce the agreement pursuant to
the FAA. 261
Thus, as a result of a general policy of enforcing arbitration clauses,
state statutes effectuating all types of state policies are subordinated.
c. State Legislative Intent
The third standard for analyzing the arbitrability of state employ-
ment claims looks to whether the state legislature intended to pre-
clude arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. In Bakri v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.,262 the District Court for the Central District of
California upheld an arbitration award resulting from a procedure
outlined in Continental's employee handbook. In accordance with
Continental's grievance procedure, Mohammed Bakri, a Continental
employee, submitted a complaint regarding his discharge to the com-
pany's grievance committee. After losing at the grievance hearing, he
sued for retaliatory discharge-a state tort claim.2 65 Continental re-
moved the action to the federal district court, which held that the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing an intention on the part of the
state legislature to preclude arbitration.2 4 Since "the text of the stat-
ute... [did] not preclude arbitration, and [the plaintiff] offered ab-
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
261 Harrison v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 593 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (Sup. Ct 1992).
262 No. CV92-3476 SVW(K), 1992 WL 464125 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1992).
263 Id. at *1-'2.
264 Id. at *4 ("IT]he burden is on Bakri to show that arbitration was not intended to
apply to the statute at issue.").
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solutely no evidence that the California state legislature intended to
preclude arbitration of his claims,"265 the court concluded that arbi-
tration was required.
d. Interest Analysis
At least one court has employed a more flexible "interest analysis"
standard in determining the arbitrability of state employment law
claims. In Singer v. Salomon Bros.,266 a securities broker brought sev-
eral state claims against his employer, alleging that "his dismissal was
discriminatory and based upon his disability."267 The New York
Supreme Court stated that "[a] rbitration ... fulfills the strong public
policy favoring a decrease in the courts' burdensome caseload. While
there is also a public interest in the adjudication of delicate claims
such as discrimination cases, the court must balance the competing
interests." 268 Although Singer granted the employer's motion to com-
pel arbitration, the court's "balancing" analysis and its discussion of
the plaintiff's objections to the arbitration procedure269 suggest an al-
ternative to the more mechanical approaches used by other courts.
2. An Assessment of the Viability of the New Standards
Gilmer requires arbitration of federal statutory claims absent a
contrary congressional intent.2 70 It does not specify, however, how a
court deciding the arbitrability of a state employment claim should go
about determining the "intent" of Congress. Because Gilmer and prior
case law interpreting the FAA are driven by policy considerations,
courts interpreting the FAA in the context of state employment claims
should not ignore the policies supporting and opposing mandatory
arbitration of these claims. This section contends that the prevalent
arbitrability standards do not give sufficient consideration to the im-
plications of applying the FAA to state employment claims. However,
because the standards most often yield mandatory arbitration, they
may accurately anticipate future Supreme Court decisions further ex-
panding arbitrability under the FAA.
265 Id. Although the court actually held that res judicata precludes additional litiga-
tion of Bakri's claims, the opinion's implicit rationale is similar to a determination of
whether to compel arbitration.
266 593 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
267 Id. at 928.
268 Id. at 929.
269 Id. at 930.
270 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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a. Parallel Federal Claim
The parallel federal claim test of Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co.271 appears at first glance to follow directly from Gilmer. A court
ruling on a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA interprets
federal law; it will therefore need to determine Congress's intent re-
garding mandatory arbitration of the particular claim at issue. 272
Since the Fletcher court treats state claims and their federal "analogs"
as "classes of claims," the rationale appears to be that Congress must
have intended similar results under the FAA.273 Courts applying the
parallel claim test, however, have not sufficiently justified it.274
First, treating the "parallel" state cause of action as identical to its
federal analog assumes that Congress's intent concerning the arbi-
trability of state claims was the same as that for federal claims. The
Gilmer court does not suggest that its analysis of congressional intent
should extend to state causes of action.2 75 Indeed, Gilmer explicitly
leaves open the possibility that certain classes of statutory claims may
not be subject to mandatory arbitration.2 76 However, as in Fletcher,
courts enforcing agreements to arbitrate state employment claims
often cite Gilmer as determinative without further explanation.2 77
The parallel federal claim test is especially problematic when
there is no federal analog upon which to base the "congressional in-
tent" inquiry, such as when employees assert state common-law causes
of action against their employers. For example, the parallel federal
claim test does not address the question of the arbitrability of state
271 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993).
272 The Fletcher court began its analysis by stating the general proposition that the FAA
is preemptive: "[I]n situations where the FAA is applicable, it preempts State law on the
subject of the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Indeed, the provisions of the FAA are
controlling even though the dispute itself may arise under State law." Id. at 1001 (citations
omitted).
273 Although the parties in Fletcher did not litigate the specific question of the method-
ology for determining arbitrability, the court apparently based its decision on the close
resemblance between federal statutory claims and their state "analogs." Id. at 1003 ("Since
there is no evidence that Congress intended to limit the enforceability of FAA-governed
arbitration agreements in the context of this class of disputes, the courts below were cor-
rect in concluding that plaintiffs' State Human Rights Law claims should be submitted to
arbitration .... ").
274 Courts tend to assume that the test applies, without explaining why. See, e.g., Hull v.
NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Mo. 1993) ("The Court... finds that Plaintiff's
claims under the [Missouri Human Rights Act], a parallel state statutory right to Title VII,
are subject to arbitration under the FAA.").
275 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27 (discussing congressional intent underlying the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act).
276 Id. at 26 ("Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration,
'[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue.'").
277 619 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (N.Y. 1993). For a discussion of the application of the "paral-
lel claim" methodology in Fletcher, see supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
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tort theories because Congress does not ordinarily enact analogs to
causes of action defined by the state courts.278 A simplistic application
of the standard might yield mandatory arbitration because Gilmer re-
quires an affirmative intention to preclude arbitration. However, the
lack of an analogous federal cause of action may indicate any number
of things about congressional intent, the least of which is that Con-
gress wished to require arbitration of state tort claims. Thus, the par-
allel federal claim approach is mechanical; it tends to yield mandatory
arbitration without analyzing the reasons for and against arbitration of
the particular claims.
In addition, if the FAA case law is interpreted broadly, basing the
arbitrability determination on Congress's intent with respect to the
analogous federal claim may violate the Supremacy Clause. Courts
applying the preemption approach to require arbitration of all state
claims have focused on commercial arbitration cases, especially South-
land Corp. v. Keating, that have held that the FAA preempts state
law.279 This reading of the preemptive effect of the FAA suggests that
state law is not relevant to the arbitrability inquiry. For example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals in Boogher v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. focused
on Southlands literal reading of the FAA: "We see nothing in the
[FAA] indicating the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any
additional limitations under state law."280 If so, then the Gilmerexcep-
tion triggered when "Congress itself has evinced an intention to pre-
clude [arbitration]" 28 1 should have no effect when the employee's
cause of action is premised on state law, whether there is a parallel
federal claim or not.
This account of FAA preemption is concededly too simplistic.
The Supreme Court has not yet endorsed an absolute rule requiring
courts to enforce all arbitration clauses; instead, Gilmer and earlier
cases provide some support for a policy-oriented approach.28 2 As the
Supreme Court recognized in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef
Inc.,28 3 there is an important state interest in regulating the employ-
ment relationship. Lingle emphasized this state interest in its analysis
of the preemptive scope of the Taft-Hartley Act, in holding that sec-
tion 301 does not preempt a state tort claim of retaliatory discharge
278 Cf. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Be-
tween Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 575 (1992) (describing many of the tort theories available under state law).
279 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that a California statute invalidating waivers of the right
to litigate claims relating to franchises violated the supremacy clause). For discussion of
Southland, see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
280 825 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 11).
281 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
282 See, e.g., id. at 26-35 (addressing several policy considerations in the context of the
arbitrability of an ADEA claim); see also discussion supra part 1.
283 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
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for filing a workers' compensation action.28 4 The parallel federal
claim standard of arbitrability, in the context of interpreting the FAA,
ignores this state interest because it groups state and federal causes of
action into the same "class of claims."28 5
b. Preemption
The Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros.28 6 preemption standard suf-
fers from the same policy myopia as the parallel federal claim stan-
dard. Although the literal terms of FAA preemption doctrine seem to
preclude consideration of state interests,28 7 the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp. that the FAA does not require arbitration under all circum-
stances.288 The crux of the Southland decision was that the California
legislature could not obliterate the substantive requirements of the
FAA by enacting conflicting provisions in its franchise statute.28 9 This
does not mean that state interests cannot contribute to the analysis of
congressional intent.
More importantly, the preemption cases do not intimate that the
federal policy of promoting arbitration is the only relevant interest
when courts interpret the FAA in close cases. 290 The substantive law
of the FAA, rather, results from the Court's understanding of congres-
sional intent, which is driven at least in part by relevant policy consid-
erations. Moses H. Cone and Southland both involved contracts
between commercial entities. These contracts are at the heart of the
original purpose of the FAA, which was "to give an opportunity to
284 Id.
285 See Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sec., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1475 (E.D. Cal. 1991)
(holding that state discrimination claims are not exempt from arbitration under the FAA).
286 829 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1992).
287 ChiefJustice Burger wrote in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), that
"[i]n enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." Id. at 10.
288 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (positing that "exceptional circumstances" would warrant
deferring to state law in cases otherwise arbitrable under the FAA).
289 465 U.S. at 10 ("The California Supreme Court interpreted this [state] statute to
require judicial consideration of claims brought under the state statute and accordingly
refused to enforce the parties' contract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted, the Cali-
fomia Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
and violates the Supremacy Clause.").
290 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24, describes the policy as "a liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to
the contrary." However, this statement should not be interpreted as precluding any consid-
eration of state or other interests. In the same opinion, the Court used more equivocal
language suggesting that the pro-arbitration policy is not absolute: "The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the con-
struction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense
to arbitrability." Id. at 24-25.
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enforce an agreement [to arbitrate] in commercial contracts and in
admiralty contracts, when voluntarily placed in the contract by the
parties."291 Employment contracts, regardless of the outcome (if any)
of the controversy over the scope of the exclusion clause,292 are much
farther from this core purpose. Even Southland does not contemplate
a universal rule enforcing all arbitration agreements under the
FAA.293 Indeed, the plain language of the FAA sets limits on enforce-
ability.294 The FAA does not mandate court-compelled arbitration
whenever a contract contains an arbitration clause.
In other contexts, the arbitrability determination hinges on inter-
ests that are not strictly "federal." In cases involving international
commercial arbitration, for example, the Supreme Court has consid-
ered other pertinent policy interests, including the importance of a
nonfederal forum. In Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, for
example, the Court considered "international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes."295 A similar concern-respect for state tribu-
nals-is implicated when employees assert state claims against their
employers.
c. State Legislative Intent
Courts that have applied other standards to determine the arbi-
trability of state claims have strained to justify those standards. The
state legislative intent approach has a tenuous basis. Bakri v. Continen-
talAirlines, Inc., which required arbitration of a state claim because the
state legislature showed no intention to preclude arbitration, 296 may
have simply misread Gilmer. The Gilmer court analyzed congressional
intent because it was deciding whether Congress overrode the normal
FAA requirements when it authorized a cause of action under the
291 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924) (statement of FAA author Rep. Mills of New York).
For a more extensive treatment of the history of the FAA, see supra parts I.B-IIa A
292 See supra notes 137-64 and accompanying text (describing the conflict between the
federal circuits over the scope of the exclusion for "contracts of employment" in § 1 of the
FAA).
293 Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (recognizing the "exceptional circumstances" exception)
(citing Moses H. Cone 460 U.S. at 25).
294 For example, § 2 provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements to resolve
controversies "arising out of... contract[s]." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). This indicates that
certain types of disputes are not included. Although the question of which types of dis-
putes are subject to § 2 is unresolved, see, e.g., Speidel, supra note 4, no court has suggested
that the general rule of arbitrability is without exceptions.
295 Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1984). For a brief
description of MitsubisAhi, see supra note 196.
296 No. CV 92-3476 SVW(K), 1992 WL 464125 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1992).
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ADEA.297 Because subsequent state statutes cannot override a prior
federal statute, the intention of a state legislature should not be dis-
positive with respect to the FAA analysis.2 98 This does not mean, how-
ever, that the state legislature's intention, or, more generally, the
state's interest, is necessarily irrelevant to the arbitrability inquiry.
d. Interest Analysis
The interest analysis performed by the court in Singer v. Salomon
Bros.2 99 is unique because it explicitly accounted for all the interests at
stake, including the state's interest. Congress has not directly ad-
dressed the question of the arbitrability of state employment claims,
except to the extent that the provision in section 1 of the FAA exclud-
ing "contracts of employment" is indicative of Congress's intention.
Therefore, a standard that evaluates all the interests is arguably supe-
rior to more mechanical standards like the parallel federal claim test.
Unfortunately, interest analysis is not consistent with the spirit of the
FAA arbitrability doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.300 However appealing this standard may be, the
Supreme Court's recent FAA decisions make the "federal policy favor-
ing arbitration"301 nearly dispositive. The Court is therefore unlikely
to endorse a standard that simply weighs all the interests together.
The more mechanistic parallel federal claim 30 2 and simple pre-
emption 30 3 standards, despite their deficiencies, most accurately re-
flect the Supreme Court's posture on arbitrability questions. The risk
is that these standards will lead to wholesale forced arbitration of state
employment claims.3 04 Such a result would be inconsistent with the
297 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) ("Although all
statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, '[h]aving made the bargain to
arbitrate, the parties should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.' ") (emphasis sup-
plied) (quoting Mitsubish 473 U.S. at 628).
298 At the very least, the Bakri standard clashes with Southlands admonition that the
FAA "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum ... [when] the con-
tracting parties agreed to... arbitration." Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed this principle of preemption in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
115 S. Ct. 834, 838-39 (1995).
299 593 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1992). For a more thorough explanation of Singer, see
supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
300 See supra part I.C (explaining the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
FAA).
301 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
302 As exemplified by Fletcher v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993).
303 As exemplified by Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 829 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1992).
304 This eventuality is, unfortunately, not inconsistent with the more general judicial
abdication of responsibility in the arbitration area. See Carbonneau &Janson, supra note




purpose of the FAA, which excludes "contracts of employment," and
with the states' interest in regulating the employment relationship.
B. Implications of Mandatory Arbitration of State-Law Claims
In the current legal climate, courts are unlikely to endorse an
"interest analysis" approach to determining the arbitrability of state-
law claims by employees. Indeed, if either the "parallel federal claim"
or the "supremacy" test prevails, arbitrability will likely be determined
without reference to the policy prerogatives of the states. Commenta-
tors have noted the drawbacks of denying a judicial forum to employ-
ees who allege that their rights have been violated.305 Equally
disturbing, however, are the doctrinal implications of this expansion
of federal arbitration law.
1. State-Law Claims by Employees and State Interests
Whether the source of compulsory arbitration of state-law claims
is characterized as statutory interpretation or federal common law
making, it intrudes significantly into a policy area in which the states
ordinarily play a major role. Therefore, it may thwart states' ability to
fashion reforms aimed at rationalizing employment law, an effect that
Congress obviously did not contemplate when it enacted the FAA.
Compulsory arbitration of employees' state-law claims also conflicts
with other areas of law, such as preemption under the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA), in which state prerogatives are taken into
consideration. Finally, to the extent that federal arbitrability law is
driven by institutional pressures on federal courts,3 06 it should not
prevent adjudication of employment disputes involving state-law
claims.
Despite increasing federal regulation of the employment relation-
ship, the states retain a significant role. Through judicial and legisla-
tive reforms, states have helped redefine many of the ground rules.
They have gradually reduced the severity of the termination-at-will
305 See sources cited supra note 4; Holmes, supra note 1; Jacobs, supra note 3 (citing
examples of employee outrage prompted by employers' unilateral imposition of
arbitration).
306 See, e.g., Carbonneau &Janson, supra note 84, at 207. They contend that pressures
on judicial resources, especially from the volume and complexity of federal criminal litiga-
tion, have led federal courts to use alternative dispute resolution as "a means of channel-
ling non-criminal litigation to private adjudicatory processes." Id. at 207. They continue:
Some interests had to be abridged or eliminated to afford safe passage to
other more important interests. The only means of salvaging the justice
system was to have arbitrators function as de facto federal judges in a pri-
vate setting and at the cost of the parties instead of the taxpayers. The




rule by recognizing exceptions that acknowledge that employment law
is not a purely private matter. States have also fashioned comprehen-
sive solutions in particularly vexing areas of employment law. For ex-
ample, workers' compensation schemes attempt to strike a balance
between injured workers' desire for a high probability of being com-
pensated and employers' desire to contain liability costs.3 0 7
Some states have considered similar solutions in the area of em-
ployer liability for employee terminations. The theory behind unjust
dismissal statutes, like that of workers' compensation, is "more sure
recovery of smaller damages."308 Thus, the traditional termination-at-
will rule is replaced by a 'just cause" requirement, in exchange for
limits on employer liability and mechanisms aimed at reducing litiga-
tion expenses.30 9 Some form of arbitration is often part of the pro-
posed compromise.310
If federal arbitration law allows employers to impose arbitration
unilaterally-and thereby to reduce their fears concerning litigation
costs31 '-employers may be less inclined to seek or agree to such com-
promise solutions. If so, the federal judiciary will have short-circuited
the political process that might otherwise operate at the state level to
generate solutions that benefit both employers and employees.
This interference with state policy conflicts with Congress's intent
in enacting the FAA. First, as explained above, the FAA's purpose was
merely to ensure the enforceability of arbitration agreements involv-
ing disputes between merchants.31 2 Second, the legislative history in-
307 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Work-
ers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
308 WILLBORN Er pA.., supra note 13, at 255.
309 See, e.g., id. at 251-53; MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (1993) (Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act); Model Employment Termination Act §§ 1-14, 7A U.LA
75 (West Supp. 1995). See generally Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissa" Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 519-31 (1976) (advocating state legislation
requiring "just cause" for dismissal).
310 See, e.g., Model Employment Termination Act §§ 5-8, 7A U.LA. (West Supp. 1995).
Comprehensive approaches to employee termination in other countries also typically in-
volve the use of special tribunals of some sort. Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws.
Some Cautionary Notes, 33 Am. J. COMp. L. 310, 320 (1985) (analyzing the laws of Canada,
Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, andJapan).
311 For a discussion of employers' reasons for preferring ADR to litigation, see supra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
312 See Joint Hearings, supra note 131, at 6-7. An exchange between Senator Sterling,
who presided overjoint committee hearings on the FAA bill, and Charles L. Bernheimer of
the New York Chamber of Commerce illustrates the point:
Mr. Bernheimer.... Speaking for those engaged in buying and selling
merchandise, what is usually called trading, whether that be the case of the
farmer who buys his supplies, plows, and sells his produce, or the man who
sells over the counter, or what not, it is all the same. It applies to all of
them.
The Chairman. What you have in mind is that this proposed legisla-
tion relates to contracts arising in interstate commerce.
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dicates that members did not contemplate that the FAA would intrude
on state prerogatives. For example, a document submitted by the
American Bar Association and made part of the record at joint com-
mittee hearings on the bill that would later become the FAA, made it
clear that "[a] federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements does relate solely to procedure of the Federal
courts. It is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself
what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws." 313 Congress's
accession to the exclusion of "contracts of employment" from the
FAA's coverage also indicates that it did not intend to limit state policy
governing employment termination.
This intrusion by the FAA into state-law employment disputes is
also inconsistent with the federal judiciary's tendency to take states'
interests seriously in other contexts. The Supreme Court has explic-
itly taken account of states' interest in regulating the employment re-
lationship in the context of the LMIRA. 314 More generally, when
deciding whether to apply a federal common-law rule, the Court has
considered whether a state law "served legitimate and important state
interests the fulfillment of which Congress might have contemplated
through application of state law."315 But in the context of the FAA,
Mr. Bernheimer. Yes; entirely.
Id. at 7; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) ("It is
purely an act to give the merchants the right [to agree to arbitrate].") (emphasis added);
supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text; cf. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (excluding "contracts of
employment" from the scope of the FAA).
313 Joint Hearings, supra note 131, at 37 (emphasis added). Because they prepared the
original draft and led the lobbying campaign, these ABA members spoke with considerable
authority. The ABA document continues: "[It cannot] be said that the Congress ... would
infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States." Id. at 39. The ABA's three-front
lobbying strategy, which was explained to congressional members, also indicates that Con-
gress did not intend that the FAA would give federal courts the power to intrude on state
prerogatives: "This is in three segments: The first is to get a State statute, and then to get a
Federal law.... and, third, to get a treaty with foreign countries." Id. at 16 (testimony of
Julius Henry Cohen, Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American
Bar Association).
Moreover, the ABA and congressional committee members believed that the FAA was
to be enacted under Congress's power to regulate the procedures followed by the federal
courts. The ABA document, which was made available to congressional members,
continued:
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its validity
upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers of Con-
gress. This is not the fact.
The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional
provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior
Federal courts. So far as congressional acts relate to the procedure in the
Federal courts, they are clearly within the congressional power.
Id. at 37.
314 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
315 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 599 (1973).
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the Court has imposed federal law on both state and federal courts.
Employees' potential inability to litigate state-law claims against em-
ployers is an especially stark example.
2. Arbitrability Standards and the Tension Between Union and
Nonunion Arbitration Law
The post-Gilmer decisions on the arbitrability of state claims impli-
cate two tensions between arbitration in the union and nonunion con-
texts. First, an employee covered by a collective bargaining
agreement may be able to assert a statutory cause of action despite an
unfavorable arbitration of an identical claim under a private grievance
procedure. Second, the preemption of state employment claims
under section 301 of the LMRA, in its barest terms, precludes union
employees from suing in state court if their state-law theory would re-
quire interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. If the
FAA is interpreted to require arbitration of virtually all state employ-
ment claims, the arbitrability rules under the FAA will differ signifi-
candy from those covering union employees.
a. Finality of Arbitral Awards-Union and Nonunion Employees
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,31 6 a discharged union em-
ployee filed a grievance contending that his discharge was racially mo-
tivated. The collective bargaining agreement contained a broad
arbitration clause as well as a nondiscrimination clause.3 17 Following
an unfavorable award, the employee sued for racial discrimination
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.318 The Supreme Court
held that the arbitrator's decision did not preclude the subsequent
federal lawsuit.319 The Court found that the arbitrator's authority
only extended to interpreting the collective bargaining agreement,
and that Congress intended for Title VII to "supplement, rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment dis-
316 415 U.S. 36 (1973).
317 The grievance procedure, ending in binding arbitration, covered "differences
aris[ing] between the Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the
provisions of this Agreement" and "any trouble aris[ing] in the plant." Id. at 40. The
arbitration clause provided that "[t]he decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding
upon the Company, the Union, and any employee or employees involved.... The arbitra-
tor shall not amend, take away, add to, or change any of the provisions of this Agreement,
and the arbitrator's decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions
of this Agreement." Id. at 41 n.3.
318 Id. at 4243.
319 Id. at 59-60.
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crimination." 320 The Court also stressed that Title VII rights, which
include a right to ajudicial forum, may not be prospectively waived.321
Gilmer did not explicitly overrule Gardner-Denver, but distin-
guished it on the grounds that labor arbitrators have no authority to
adjudicate statutory claims,3 22 that union representation is in tension
with individual discrimination remedies, and that Gardner-Denver was
"not decided under the FAA."3 23 If these distinctions keep Gardner-
Denver alive, then union members will be able to litigate claims that
their unorganized counterparts must arbitrate. Post-Giner cases mak-
ing state-law claims arbitrable under the FAA may widen this rift be-
tween union and nonunion employees.
b. Section 301 Preemption
The FAA cases involving claims arising under state law also create
a tension with the section 301 preemption doctrine. Under section
301 of the LMRA, which gives federal courts the authority to decide
disputes involving collective bargaining agreements, employees are
precluded from asserting certain state-law claims when those claims
are related to the rights governed by an applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement. This doctrine is based on the premise that the sub-
stantive law of section 301 displaces contrary state law insofar as it
conflicts with the policies underlying the federal labor statutes.324
The most notable pronouncement of that doctrine is Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef Inc.,325 which framed preemption in terms of
whether "the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the mean-
ing of a collective-bargaining agreement" 326 Lingle held that section
301 does not preempt a claim of retaliatory discharge when an em-
ployer is accused of firing an employee for filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim.3 2 7
320 Id. at 48-49.
321 Id. at 51-52. The Court acknowledged that an employee may retroactively waive a
Title VII right of action by settling with the employer. Id. at 52.
322 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34 (1991) ("The arbitrator's
'task is to effectuate the intent of the parties' and he or she does not have the 'general
authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties.' ") (quot-
ing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53).
323 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
324 See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) ("The
dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law
must be paramount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in
the process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, re-
quiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the
precepts of federal labor policy.").
325 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
326 Id. at 405-06.
327 Id. at 413.
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Section 301 preemption eliminates many state-law claims that
could otherwise be brought by union employees.3 28 Because collec-
tive bargaining agreements typically provide for grievance arbitration,
disputes giving rise to state-law claims that are preempted under sec-
tion 301 will generally be resolved through arbitration or will not be
resolved at all. However, section 301 preemption does not apply to all
categories of employment-related state-law claims. The doctrine
carves out a set of state-law claims, albeit a small one, that union mem-
bers may invoke independently of the arbitration process. Claims of
retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claims, claims
of discrimination, claims of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and "whistleblowing" claims generally are not preempted by sec-
tion 301.329
The standards applied in FAA cases involving state-law employ-
ment claims, however, suggest no such limits to the pro-arbitration
stance in the nonunion setting. This asymmetrical situation may re-
sult, in part, from the tension between Gilmer, which made ADEA
claims by individual employees arbitrable, and Gardner-Denver, which
held that a union employee who had submitted a discrimination dis-
pute to arbitration could nonetheless litigate a Title VII claim. The
Lingle court assumed, for example, that employees are able to vindi-
cate their rights against discrimination independently from grievance
procedures in union contracts,33 0 a proposition that has no analog in
the nonunion context. However, Lingle also placed heavy emphasis
on the state's interest in regulating the employment relationship:
"preemption should not be lightly inferred in this area, since the es-
tablishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power
of the State. ' 331 Thus, the asymmetry between the types of claims that
are arbitrable in the union and nonunion setting is also due to the
overemphasis of federal pro-arbitration policy at the expense of legiti-
mate state concerns in FAA cases.
Although asymmetry in the rules governing union and nonunion
employees is not intrinsically problematic, it should at least be rational
and consistent with federal labor policy. By requiring nonunion em-
ployees to arbitrate claims that their union counterparts may litigate,
however, courts may be giving additional protection to those employ-
ees who need it least.332
328 See generally Van Wezel Stone, supra note 278 (comprehensive analysis of § 301
preemption).
329 See id. at 607-13.
330 See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412-13.
331 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21
(1987)).
332 Gilmer distinguishes Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), in part
by emphasizing the risk that the power of the majority in the union context will undermine
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In addition, this asymmetry may undermine the LMRA. The
"substantive law" applicable under section 301 was, 333 at least in the-
ory, premised on the notion that "the agreement to arbitrate griev-
ance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."33 4
Arbitration agreements were viewed as an important incentive to pro-
ducing collective bargaining agreements.3 35 Today, the high litigation
costs incurred by employers have reversed the incentives-employers,
not employees, wish to use arbitration to settle disputes. From the
perspective of promoting collective bargaining, the arbitrability rules
are undesirable: employers can impose arbitration of a wide variety of
claims-including those arising from state law-on nonunion employ-
ees, whereas union employees can litigate many claims even though a
grievance arbitration has occurred.336
C. The Limits of Arbitrability: Containing the "Federal Policy
Favoring Arbitration"
Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to give substantial weight
to the states' interest in deciding the arbitrability of state employment
claims, section 1 of the FAA may provide a second-best solution. The
clause exempting "contracts of employment" from the FAA provides a
textual basis for excluding some employment claims from the man-
date of the FAA. By relying on section 1, courts could recognize rea-
sonable limits on the Supreme Court's ardent pro-arbitration stance
in FAA cases.33 7
the vindication of antidiscrimination rights. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 35 (1991). However, this observation does notjustify asymmetric treatment. First,
it assumes that nonunion employees have sufficient power to vindicate their rights in an
arbitral forum-a forum that is in fact chosen by the employer. Second, the logic does not
apply to disputes that do not implicate majoritarian problems.
333 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
334 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
335 Id. at 455 ("[The LMRA] expresses a federal policy that federal courts should en-
force these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial
peace can be best obtained only in that way.").
336 This observation suggests that the current structure of the federal arbitrability rules
makes it less likely that collective bargaining will occur. Although employer opposition to
unions may be a significant cause of union decline, see, e.g., RicHARD B. FRErsM N &JAMES L.
MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 238-39 (1984), employers' attitude toward unions might be
different if employers could not extract arbitration agreements from nonunion employees.
This proposition, however, lacks independent empirical support. In addition, because
§ 301 preemption completely precludes union members from litigating many state-law
claims, see Van Wezel Stone, supra note 278, at 607-13; supra notes 328-29 and accompany-
ing text, employers already stand to reduce the cost of litigating state-law disputes by enter-
ing into collective bargaining agreements. In short, inferences about the effects of such
incentives on collective-bargaining behavior are speculative.
337 See discussion supra part I.B. The Supreme Court could, of course, close the § 1
route by explicitly holding that the exclusion clause has a very narrow scope.
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1. Broad Construction of the "Contracts of Employment" Exclusion
The first way to limit the FAA's applicability to state-law employ-
ment claims is to reject a narrow construction of the section 1 exclu-
sion clause. Under the most narrow reading of this clause, its scope is
limited to employees directly involved in interstate transportation.338
The federal courts of appeals adopted this view of section 1 in the
1950s in cases involving section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act.3 39 The reasoning supporting this interpretation was in the
first instance tenuous and, as explained in Part IMA, its view of the
clause is now irrelevant. Lincoln Mills held that section 301 itself pro-
vided substantive law and the subsequent Steelworkers cases held that
section 301 requires federal enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
disputes over collective bargaining agreements.3 40
Today, courts reading the section 1 proviso narrowly rely on the
pre-Trilogy cases like Tenney Engineering to make the FAA applicable to
most employment contracts.3 41 This approach does not take the ex-
338 See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text. As that portion of this Note ex-
plains, until the Supreme Court held that § 301 of the LMRA provides for a substantive
federal law governing the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements (a somewhat
surprising proposition), lower federal courts quite predictably sought that authority in the
Federal Arbitration Act. Faced with a seemingly clear impediment to applying the FAA-a
clause excluding "contracts of employment" from the Act's reach-some of those courts
performed the interpretive tap-dance of reading the exclusion clause to include very few
workers in "commerce" but reading the rest of the FAA to reach all the arbitration agree-
ments that Congress could reach under its commerce clause power.
340 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
341 Part HA supra explains that Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio &
Machine Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953), construed the FAA § 1 proviso as
inapplicable to a collective bargaining agreement involving employees who were not en-
gaged in the actual movement of interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S.
Ct. 834 (1995) (holding that the FAA's scope coincides with that of the commerce clause
because Congress used the words "involving commerce" in § 2 of the FAA), could provide
a basis for a narrow interpretation of the exclusion clause in § 1. The exclusion applies to
contracts of"class[es] of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1994). Because the magic words "involving commerce" were not used in § 1, a narrower
interpretation of the exclusion clause is arguably warranted. As suggested supra note 120,
however, such a conclusion is not compelled.
There is no evidence in the legislative record indicating that Congress intended a
narrower scope for the exclusion clause than for the substantive provisions of the Act.
Although seamen and railroad workers-the examples of classes of workers referred to in
§ 1-are closely connected to the flow of interstate commerce, legislators were told by the
ABA that the Act did not "refer[ ] to labor disputes at all" Senate Hearings, supra note 125,
at 9 (emphasis added); see supra note 133. Moreover, the broad definition of"commerce"
in § 1 appears in the same sentence as the "contracts of employment" exclusion. The
Allied-Bruce Terminix majority relied on this very definition-which uses the language of the
commerce clause-in holding that the FAA's provisions are as broad as the commerce
power permits. See 115 S. Ct. at 840. Immediately after setting forth this broad definition,
Congress excluded contracts of workers "engaged in commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
Therefore, Congress most likely meant to exclude workers engaged in the same broad set
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clusion clause seriously, and it ignores the pre-Trilogy context of cases
like Tenney Engineering. In addition, this narrow construction of the
FAA's exclusion clause conflicts with the strong state interest in regu-
lating the employment relationship, which the Court recognized in
Lingle.3 42 A broad interpretation of the "contracts of employment"
proviso is therefore desirable.
2. A Middle Ground: Protecting 'Workers" Under the Exclusion
Clause
Courts might also limit the arbitrability of state-law employment
claims by focusing on the word "workers" in section 1. The exclusion
clause does not exempt employment contracts generally; it only ex-
cludes those in "class [es] of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."343 Recent cases have not distinguished between employ-
ees who are "workers" and those who are not. However, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America, faced the issue of whether a contract between a plant superin-
tendent and his employer was governed by the FAA.3 44 The court
held that the exclusion clause did not reach the contract because a
plant superintendent is not a "worker" within the meaning of the
FAA.345
This interpretation of "worker" is consistent with the language of
section 1 as well as the legislative history. The exclusion clause, as the
Second Circuit pointed out, refers to classes of workers like seamen
of activities it had just defined. If Congress had intended a narrower meaning for the
exclusion clause, it would probably have included some qualifying language beyond merely
using the word "in."
If Congress had policy in mind when it added the exclusion clause, it is unlikely that it
meant to limit the clause to a very narrow set of employees. If, on the other hand, the
clause (as argued supra note 133) was merely intended to state the obvious-the FAA was
only meant to apply to contracts between merchants-then construing the exclusion more
narrowly than the substantive provisions is wholly unwarranted.
342 See supra note 331 and accompanying text. If the Supreme Court were to interpret
the § 1 exclusion clause, the Allied-Bruce Terminix dissenters would face an interesting test:
how faithful are they to the "core principles of federalism"? See 115 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see also supra note 92 (brief description of dissent). As Part Ill.B.1 of this
Note observes, compulsory arbitration of employees' state-law claims significantly intrudes
on states' policies in the employment realm. In addition, Justice Thomas's more general
concerns about the implications of extending the FAA beyond the federal courts apply in
all employment cases. He and Justice Scalia might, therefore, be expected to endorse a
broad reading of the § 1 exclusion.
343 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
344 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948, 951 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
345 Id. at 951-52 (reasoning that Bernhardt "was not hired as a 'worker' but as a plant




and railroad workers. 46 The court reasoned that Bernhardt "was not
hired as a 'worker' but as a plant superintendent... with managerial
duties fundamentally different from those of 'workers.' "347 California
courts have interpreted the California arbitration statute in a similar
way,34s as have courts interpreting the word "labor" in other
contexts.
3 49
Some courts interpreting the word "labor" have emphasized the
purported distinction between "physical" and "mental" tasks.350 This
functional approach is questionable. First, it may unnecessarily de-
mean "physical" work and create the false impression that employees
who do such work deserve special protection because of their inher-
846 Id. at 951 ("The words 'any other class of workers,' read in connection with the
immediately preceding words, show an intention to exclude contracts of employment of a
'class' of 'workers' like 'seamen' or 'railroad employees.' ").
847 Id. at 951-52.
348 See Levy v. Superior Court, 104 P.2d 770 (Cal. 1940), where the court stated:
It may not be doubted that an actor, or an artist, a clergyman, a general
manager, sales manager or other executive, secretary, attorney, or judge,
labors; but this court... [has] determined that it was the obvious intention
of the legislature that contracts involving individuals whose principal efforts
were directed to the accomplishment of some mental task were not to be
classified as contracts "pertaining to labor"; that the word "labor" as used in
the section meant "that kind of human energy wherein physical force, or
brawn and muscle, however skillfully employed, constitute the principal ef-
fort to produce a given result, rather than where the result to be accom-
plished depends primarily upon the exercise of the mental faculties."
Id. at 773 (citing Universal Pictures Corp. v. Superior Court, 50 P.2d 500, 501 (Cal. 1935));
see also Kerr v. Nelson, 59 P.2d 821, 823 (Cal. 1936) (holding that a sales manager does not
perform "labor" within the meaning of the California arbitration statute).
349 See, e.g., Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (a minister
does not "perform labor" for purposes of a federal statute "to Prohibit the Importation of
Foreigners and Aliens under Contract to Perform Labor"); Tatsukichi Kuwabara v. United
States, 260 F. 104 (9th Cir. 1919) (a language teacher did not "perform labor" for purposes
of exclusion from admission to the United States under immigration law); Latta v. Lons-
dale, 107 F. 585, 585 (8th Cir. 1901) ("A lawyer employed by a railroad company on a
yearly salary, payable monthly, is not a laborer or employ6, within the meaning of [an
Arkansas statute governing priority among creditors of insolvent corporations]."); Gay v.
Hudson River Electric Power Co., 178 F. 499 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1910) (an attorney hired to
solicit purchase options was not a "workingman or laborer" under a New York statute regu-
lating creditor priority); In re Ho King, 14 F. 724 (D. Or. 1883) (an actor was not a "la-
borer" for purposes of exclusion from the United States under a treaty with China); Lesuer
v. City of Lowell, 116 N.E. 483 (Mass. 1917) (a vocational teacher was not a "laborer,"
"workman," or "mechanic" and therefore fell outside workers' compensation statute);
Wirth v. Calhoun, 89 N.W. 785 (Neb. 1902) (musical entertainers did not engage in "com-
mon labor" and therefore were not covered by the prohibitions of the Sunday law); Wey-
mouth v. Sanborn, 43 N.H. 171 (1861) (analyzing services performed by doctors); School
Dist. No. 94 v. Gautier, 73 P. 954 (Okla. 1903) (a teacher was not a "laborer of any kind,
clerk, servant, nurse or other person [bringing an action] for compensation claimed due
for personal services performed" under a state statute allowing such litigants to recover
attorneys' fees).
350 See supra note 348.
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ent capabilities-or lack thereof.35' Second, the functional approach
falsely assumes that "mental" and "physical" tasks are different and
that they can be distinguished. Third, the approach in any event is of
little use today because of the emergence of a service-based economy.
A more appropriate inquiry may therefore be a power test: an
employee is in a "class of workers" for purposes of being excluded by
section 1 of the FAA if the employee would have been unable to bar-
gain effectively with the employer over the inclusion of the arbitration
clause in the employment contract.3 52 This test is desirable for at least
three reasons. First, although the legislative record is far from
clear,353 the evidence suggests that Congress excluded "contracts of
employment" from the FAA to prevent employers from forcing arbi-
tration of one type or another on employees who were not powerful
enough to stop them. Second, the power test is consistent with the
Second Circuit's determination in Bernhardt, which was not disturbed
by the Supreme Court in that landmark case.354 Third, the power ap-
proach to defining "worker" produces a superior arbitrability rule-
employees who cannot effectively bargain over the inclusion of arbi-
tration clauses in their contracts cannot be denied access to the courts
on the whim of their employers.3 55
This understanding of the word "workers" allows Gilmer to be har-
monized with Gardner-Denver Harrell Alexander worked as a drill
press operator,3 56 whereas Robert Gilmer was a manager of financial
services. 357 If Alexander is viewed as a "worker," then the collective
bargaining agreement in Gardner-Denver falls within the FAA's section
1 exclusion clause. The FAA would therefore not constrain an em-
ployee like Alexander from pursuing a Title VII action after a com-
pleted grievance arbitration. Robert Gilmer's contract would be
351 Alternatively, the functional approach might be taken to glorify traditionally male
job classifications. In the context of the FAA, it would give more procedural protection to
employees in such categories because their employers could not force them to arbitrate
rather than litigate.
352 This view is consistent with the emerging understanding that interactions between
players within an enterprise-and between an enterprise and external players-do not
occur in a power vacuum. The results of such interactions depend upon the relative bar-
gaining strength of the players. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theoyy of the
Firm, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 540 (1995) (arguing that the law should take account of differ-
ences in the relative bargaining strength of managers and shareholders within a firm).
353 See supra part HA
354 SeeBernhardtv. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948,951-52 (2d Cir. 1955) (hold-
ing that a plant supervisor is not a "worker" within the meaning of § 1), rev'd on other
ground!; 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
355 Because Congress has specifically made the judgment that workers' contracts are
not covered by the FAA, this way of defining "workers" is justified despite the general prop-
osition that fraud-not mere lack of bargaining power-is necessary to avoid compulsory
arbitration under the FAA.
356 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1973).
357 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
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covered by the FAA, however, because he is not a "worker" within the
meaning of the section 1 exclusion clause.
3. Federal Legislation
Legislation would be another solution to the courts' expansive
interpretation of the FAA. Uproar over employment arbitration prac-
tices in the securities industry led to the introduction of remedial leg-
islation in the 103d Congress.3 58 This proposed legislation was of two
types. One bill would have amended several federal statutes gov-
erning employment to prevent denial of the judicial forum by means
of contractual provisions.35 9 A more general proposal would have
prohibited employers from forcing employees to arbitrate, without
amending particular federal civil rights statutes.3 60
The analysis in this Note supports the latter approach. Because
courts have used the FAA to require arbitration of state-law claims,
amending the federal civil rights laws would not solve the problem. If
Congress passed a statute affecting onlyfederal laws, courts would con-
tinue to apply a broad preemption standard to keep state claims out
of court. The substantive rights of employees are governed, to a large
extent, by state laws. Therefore, more general legislation is war-
ranted. Legislation addressing the arbitrability of employee rights of
action under both state and federal law would give states more leeway
in resolving problems in the nonunion workplace. Unfortunately, the
results and aftermath of the 1994 congressional elections suggest that
Congress will not be especially sympathetic to the right of employees
to seek redress in court.3 6' Courts should therefore jettison their ex-
treme pro-arbitration stance and interpret the FAA with an eye toward
treating union and nonunion workers more consistently.
CONCLUSION
Courts apply a variety of standards to determine if Congress "in-
tended" to exclude a state employment claim from mandatory arbitra-
tion under the FAA. The common feature of these standards is that
they typically yield mandatory arbitration, a result that is consistent
with the Supreme Court's broad reading of the FAA. This result may,
however, conflict with the letter and purpose of the FAA because the
FAA specifically excludes "contracts of employment" from its scope,
358 See Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMm,
Mar. 18, 1994, at Al (describing controversy over mandatory arbitration by employees);
Jacobs, supra note 3 (citing congressional interest in the wake of controversy).
359 See H.R. 4981, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 2405, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
360 See S. 2012, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
361 But cf. Jacobs, supra note 3 (indicating that key Republicans have shown interest in
bills protecting employees from mandatory arbitration).
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and because Congress-and the Supreme Court in other circum-
stances-has recognized a significant state interest in policing the em-
ployment relationship. Mandatory arbitration of employment claims
also creates a tension with the law governing union employees, be-
cause unionized employees may pursue at least some claims in ajudi-
cial forum despite an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement.
To avoid the pervasive reach of the federal law of arbitrability,
courts should construe the exclusion clause in section 1 of the FAA
more broadly. In addition, courts could interpret the word "workers"
in the FAA clause excluding "contracts of employment" as covering
employees who lack the power to bargain effectively with their em-
ployers over the inclusion of arbitration clauses in their employment
contracts. This might allow mandatory arbitration of employment
claims by stockbrokers, for example, but not of claims by many service
sector or production employees. Such a view of the FAA would also
conform to the federal labor laws, which favor collective bargaining
and which displace state-law causes of action that require courts to
interpret such agreements.
The two-faced evolution of arbitration law under the FAA and
section 301 of the LMRA has led courts to apply different rules to
union and nonunion workers. Although dissimilar treatment is war-
ranted in some circumstances, the current rules governing the arbi-
trability of state-law claims, paradoxically, often give more protection to
employees who are represented by unions than those who are not. By
interpreting the FAA so as to immunize at least some state-law employ-
ment claims from mandatory arbitration, courts could treat union and
nonunion workers in a more consistent way.
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